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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
:many have said that the headlonc pursuit of pleasure is an 
outstanding characteristic of our aGe. Surely the comrnercial 
advertisements we are forced to look at and listen to seem to 
bear out this contention: "For your greater smoking pleasure;" 
"Therets more pure pleasure in every drop;" "Have yourself a 
pleasure-treat." And toastmasters at important functions have 
been saying "I take great pleasure in presentinG • •• " for years. 
Pl~asure is a word we use frequently, yet I1l0st of the tiL1e we do 
not advert to its meaning. INhat i s pleastu~e? That is the pl~ima.ry 
question to be answered in this otudy. The clear presentation of 
st. Thomas Aquinas' a answer to this question is the ultimate E:;oal 
of this thesis. 
That there is c:enuine need for such a study has become ap-
parent in the search for secondary sources. So far as can be 
learned, no really adequate study and prosentation of st. Thomas's 
doctrine on pleasure exists in any lanGuage, ~~d practically no-
thing at all has been written in English. 
As was said above, the most important question to be asked 
and answered is, "What is pleasure accordinG to st. Thomas'? tt This 
1 
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will involve an investigation of the location of pleasure among 
the categories, of its causes, requisite conditions and effects. 
As the thesis title indicates, only the metaphysical and psycho-
logical aspects of pleasure will be treated; the moral aspect will 
be excluded frol':l consideration. 
Briefly, the procedure will be to locate, collate, and ex-
pound st. Thomas's teaching on pleasure. The location phase is 
larsely taken care of by the fact that there are three extended 
treatments of pleasure, each in a major worl{ and each in a differ-
ent context. The Comm.entarz £!! the Sentences treats pleasure in a 
discussion of beatitude; the ~wruna Theolosia! takes it up in a 
discussion of the passions; the Comrllenta:r:z 2!! ~he Ethics deals 
with it in an ethical context. There is also a briefer but still 
important passage on pleasure in the Q£ Y,eri tate that wi 11 come 
under consideration. These four tn.ajor works of St. Thomas with 
their treatment of pleasure will be the primary sources for this 
thesis. Of course, incidental statements ma.de about pleasure in 
these and other works will be talcen into account and will be found 
through the standard Thomistio repertories. 
In locating secondary sources, all the standaI'd referenoe 
orks for Thomistio studies have been used, including those biblio-
graphies published in the leading periodicals. The final list of 
books and articles is selective. The passing referenoes to pleas-
ure made in Scholastic manuals and textbooks of general psychology 
are too geneI'al to be of much help. Much has been wri ttan on the 
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morality of pleasure, of course, but these disoussions touch the 
matter of this thesis only indiI'ectly. 
Since this is mainly an exegetical study of St. Thomas, tho 
number and quality of the secondary sources is not of primary im-
portance. They will be used only in an auxiliary manner to clari-
fy, su.rnmarize and chock or substantiate the interpretation of St. 
Tho:nas presented in this study. 
In planning this thesis, a key problem prosented itself in 
the very beginning. Should the Thomistic dootrine on pleasure be 
presented systematioally or chronologically? The following con-
siderations have led to the adoption of the chronological method. 
F'irst, the four major \'COrks cited as primary sources cover a 
span of about fifteen years in the life of St. Thomas. This pre-
sents a sple~jid opportunity to note development and refinement 
of dootrine during this period of time, if there be any. 
Seoond, investigation has shown that some dovelopment of doc-
trine has taken plaoe. Taking eaoh work in its proper sequence 
seems to be the bost way to point up this development, for the 
extensive collation of the systenatio approaoh would lead to con-
siderable overlapping and wearisome backtracking. For tile same 
reason, the ohr'onoloFioal method is also better fOI" olarity and 
ease of presentation and cOlnprehension. 
Wi th the ohronolo:"'"ical approach dec:tded upon, the corl.~ect 
sequence of the four primary sources must be established by deter-
mining thoir dates of oomposition. This is not an easy task by 
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any means, and laadinc scholars on the ch.ronology of st. Thomas's 
works are not in full accord. To avoid being long and burdensome, 
we will merely present the conclusions of the latest and best 
studies by leading scholars toeether with the references and allow 
the reador to investir;ate the question of chronology further if 
he wishes. 
It seo:ns that the earliest of the four primary sources used 
in this thesis is the q,ommentary; .2!! .E:-~e Sent.ence!l. The commonly 
accepted date of conpos! tion is 1254-56, with the fOUl~th book pos-
sibly runninG oval." into 1257. Grabmann montions the possibility 
of a second redaction about ten years la.ter, but this is still a 
hypothesis which lacks conclusive proof. l 
The date of' the De Veri tate is very little d:tsputed by scho-
lars. 'Jlhe corn.,llonly accepted date is 1256-59. The rea.son for the 
four-year spread in the date of composition is not hard to find. 
The Qua~stlones Disputatae ~ V~ritate are a series of class dis-
cussions or disputations held by St. Thomas while he was teaching 
at the Unlveraity of Paris. They were held frequently for a period 
of years indioated by the spread 1256-59. Since tile section from 
this wOl"lc of interest to us occurs quite near the end, we can 
assume that it was written by St. Thomas in 1258 or 1259, appro x-
imately two years after he completed tho C,orrll'nentarz £g ~ Senton-
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Turning now to the Comtnentacr .2!! the Nicomachean Ethics, we 
find very great disagreement among scholars. Dates of composition 
varying from 1259 to 1271 have been given, aooepted by some, re-
jected by others and the discussion continues unabatod. The date 
given by Mandop..net,2 1266, stood unchallenged for oone years. But 
within the last decade discussions based on internal evidence have 
appeared. In an article published in 19LJ.9, Gerard Verbeke assigns 
the date of 1260 to the oomposi tion of this oomrl1entary.3 He bases 
his jud~~ent on a careful analYSis of the dootrine of the essenoe 
of beatitude and or the role accorded to pleasure in mants beati-
tude in this commentary and in othor important works of st. Thomas 
whose dates are fairly well established. 
H.-A. Gauthier, a.p., published an article in 1951 giving the 
years 1270 or 1271 as the date of the composition of the Commen-
I tary 2n !h! Nicomach~ Ethios.4 His judgment is based on the 
evolution of the doctrine on the virtue of magnanimity and its 
opposed vioes. In an artiole published in 1952, TiTansion disousses 
the work of Verbeke and Gauthier but a1?,roes with neither. He 
2p. r,Jiandonnet and J. Dastrez, Bibliop:raEhie Thol';1.i.ste, Vol. I 
of Dibllothegue !hom~st~ (Kain, 192~, p. r3. 
30lh"ard Verbeke ttLa date du cOl'n.:nontalre de S. Thor.UlS sur 11 
Ethique 4 Hicomaquo, r, Hovue Philoso2hiq~e de Lo.uv:~, XLVII {191t9}, 
203-220. 
4n. -A. Ga~thler, o. P. ~ "La date du Commentaire do Saint '.Phomas 
sur ~'Ethique a Nicol~aque! Reohercl~e~ ~ theologie ancionno at 
medio'!,ale, XVIII (1951), 06-1:05. 
6 
maintains that the terminus !; quC! of the commentary 1s after the 
Prima. ~ of the S1lmil'lf! !,heolof:iae and that the terminqs . !1 qU~I!! 
is around the time of the Prita.~ Secundae. 5 This would place it 
between the years 1266 and 1268 if we accept Grabmannts dates for 
" these two parts of the S'Ilml.;:a 'rheolop:iae.:,) Grabrnann, ac;Peeing with 
Verbeke, gives 1260 as the date of the Ethic~, but mentions that 
Walz favors 1269. 7 
With such wi. de divergences among the authorities, it is ex-
tremely difficult to assign a definite date for the composition of 
this commentary. Fortunately, an approximate date will suffice 
for our purposes here, for if we can place it after the Q! ~­
~ and before the Pr!m~ Secu..'1dae it will have a defin! te place 
in the chronological sequence of' the four primary sources. How 
the earliest date for tho composition of the Comnlcntarl .2!! 2 
Ethic~, given by any authority is 1260. This places it at least 
one year after the completion of the De VeritB:te. PlaCing the 
Ethics before the Pri,mf.! Secundae, however, is not quite so simple. 
The date of the Prima Secundae is given as 1266-68 by Grabmann8 
r:: /A. Mansion, "Autour de In. date du COl1lmentaire de Saint Thomas 
sur ltEthique a Nlcomaque," Revue Phi1osophl9.uo de Louvaln, L (1952), 460-471. ._... . .. -
6arabmann, ~ Werke, 294-301. 
7Ib1d., 284. 
8Ib1d., 294-301. Glorleux gives 1269-70 for the composition 
of the~ma Secundae. See "Pour la chronlogio de 1a Somme," 
1';!61an~s ~ ~c!once religieuse, II (l9I~5), 59-98. 
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and 1269-70 by Mandonnet. 9 Both these datos are before Gauthier's 
date for the Ethics and coincide with Walz's date. But tho weight 
of current opinion places the Ethic~ considerably earlier, any-
where from 1260 (Verbeke and Grabmann) to 1266 (Mandonnet and Man-
sion). Therefore it seems best to side w.1th the weight of author-
ity and place the ~thics before the Prima Seoundae. 
The four primary sources, then, fall into the following 
chronological sequence: Commentarz £e ~ Senten~es, ~ Veritate, 
Commentarl 2.!! the Nicomaehean Ethics, and the Prl~a Secundae of 
the Sum.rna Theologiae. They wi.. 11 be taken up in this order in the 
body of the thesis. As eaoh work: comes under consideration, a morE 
or less detailed discussion of the loci and context of the pas-
sages to be studied will be given. This is imperative for a clear 
understanding of tho doctrine. 
Before undertaking the study of St. Thomas himself, it will 
be well to follow his exanlple in briefly reviewing the opinions of 
Plato and Aristotle on pleasure. For Thomas rarely speaks of 
pleasure at any length without mentioning the position of one or 
both of these men, and he frequently uses their definitions as a 
starting point for his own discussion. lO 
Plato's doctrine on pleasure is not easy to formulate, for he 
more often speaks of the place of pleasure in the ethical life of 
9Mandonnet, Bibliographie !homiste" p. 13. 
10Examples of this are 1a IV Sent." 49, 3, 1, and ~.!., I-II, 
31, 1. 
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man than of its nature. But in the ninth book of the Reoublic he 
-,;,..;;,;;;;;.;:;;..;;;..;;,. 
speaks ot it as x{\lT)a'~J "movement,"ll and in the Ehilebus as 
ye\lta,~, "becoming, generation. tt12 The latter work oontains the 
lnore oomplete development and Is the one usually quoted from by 
Aristotle and St. Thomas. Therefore the thilebus wl11 be the ma.jor 
source for the following brief outline of the Platonio doctrine on 
pleasure. 
As an aid in determining the places of pleasure and knowledge 
in the good for man, Plato sets up a fourfold olassifioation of all 
things. 13 Anything Which is actual can be placed in one of the 
following four classes: the ~nfinite or Wlbounded (~O a~£tpo\l); 
limi~; the mixture or combination of both infinite and limit; and 
the oause or principle whioh brings them together. Pleasure and 
pain belong to the infinite, since neither, in its own nature, has 
a minimum or maximum. But they depend on their anteoedents for 
measure and proportion, and participate in the harmony of their 
causes. 
The subject of pleasure and pain, or that in which they arIse, 
is always a living, sentient being. ;"Yhen the proper balanoe be-
tween the constituents of an organism 1s disturbed, pain 1s felt; 
and when it is restored after being disturbed, pleasure is felt. 
llp~ato, The Jtepublio, ,583e, ~ J2.ia.loeue~ of Pla~.£, trans. B. 
Jowett, 4th ed:-tOxford, 1953), II, 450. 
12plato, Philebus, 53c, The Dialofues of Plato, trans. B. 
Jowett, 2nd ad. (6xford, 187~rV, 10 • - -
13Ibid •• 230-e. 63-6u. 
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In other words, disturbanoe of organio equilibrium is attended by 
pain, restoration of the equilibrium by pleasUl'e. 14 But this is 
only one kind of pleasure. r:f.lhere is a seoond kind whioh depends on 
mental prooesses, and is not acoompanied by either disturbanoe or 
reoovery of balanoe in the organism. Simple examples are the im-
agination of something pleasant or the memory of a painful exper-
ienoe, whioh induce pleasure and pain respectively. 
There is also a state which is neutral in respect to pleasure 
and pain. This is the life of thourht and oontemplation led by the 
man of wisdom, a life of permanent maintenanoe of equilibrium. 
This is probably the most godlike of all lives. It is most nearly 
approached in the aesthetic contemplation of pure colors, pure 
mathematical forms, and, generally speaking, the pleasures of 
learning and knowledge which are not oonditioned by some precedent 
pain. Suoh pleasures are more pure and more real than the pleas-
ures that aooompany the restoration of organio equilibrium. 
It seems to be Plato's mind that all pleasures, even those due 
to mental activity, involve some yeveo& " "beooming," and henoe are 
not fully real. He seems to say that pleasure is an acoompaniment 
of transitions and developments, ,ulv6~evovJ dAA' odx ov. 1b It 18 
experienoed while the transition is going on, but oeases when the 
definite and permanent end of the transition is reached. This no~ 
14Ibid., 31d-e, P. 73. See Albort Lafontaine, La Plaislr 
d'apres-priton et Aristote (Paris, 1902), pp. 51-$2,-Where a simi-
tar tl'eatment of pleasure in the Timaeus is outlined. 
-
15Plato, Republic, IX, 584a, p. 1+57; P,hilebus, 1.i-2c, p. 87. 
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tion seems to arise from a natural extension of the disturbanoe-
restoration theory to oover all oasss of pleasure. On this theory, 
the good, healthy, or normal state is, of course, that of balanoe 
or equilibrium. Pain and pleasure are both felt only when there is 
a departure from this ideal oondition-pain while the prooess of 
depletion is going on, pleasure while that of repletion or restor-
ation of the balance is happening. The natural end or goal of this 
"repletion" is the establishment of an equilibrium, and the best 
thing that could happen to a man is that the equilibrium, once re-
stored, should be permanent. But on this theory pleasure 1s felt 
only durIng the repletion by whioh we approach this best condition, 
When we have reached it and are steadily persisting in it there is 
no longer any process of repletion and consequently no pleasure. 
Pleasure accompanies our progress to the good, but not our enjoy-
ment of it; that will be the neutral state, painless but not pleas 
urable. This is what is meant by the view that pleasure is always 
"beooming," never is "being." However, it should be noted that 
intelleotual pleasure haa more of "being" and less of "becoming tf 
than oorporal pleasure. Now the more a thing becomes real, the 
more it tends toward stability and repose. That is why the philO-
sopher, through contemplation, can reach the mean state between 
pleasure and psi n, where there is perfect stability and repose 
because there is fulness of being. 
Aristotle only gradually movos away from the Platonic view or 
pleasure. In the early Magns; Moralia we find the follo\v-lng defini 
11 
tion: "Pleasure is a restoration of each to its own nature from 
that which runs counter to it. n16 Again, something very similar 
occurs in the Rpetoric: "We may say that pleasure is a movement of 
the soul and a conscious restoration of it as a Whole to its normal 
state of being; and that pain is the oPPosite. n17 Probably in 
these instances Aristotle is not trying to be scientifically accu-
rate. Ho is content to base his doctrine on a generally accepted 
definition, at least aftel" he has somewhat modified it. 
The discussion of pleasure in Book VII of the Nioomachean 
~thics, whether it was originally a part of the Eudemian Ethics or 
pot, seems to mark an intermediate or transitional stage of davel-
ppment in the Aristotelian dootrine. Here Aristotle, thinking 
~inly of the pleasures vlich involve little or no disturbance of 
ithe natural balance, calls pleasure an activity, ~\I£PYE'Cl. An 
~ctivity as well as a state (I~,') may be good, he says. The ac-
~ivities that restore us to our natural balanced state are pleasant 
~ncidcntally, but the activity involved is that of the part of our 
pature which has remainod in its natural cond:i.tion. There are ac-
tivities like those of thought which are pleasant \Yi thout involving 
a deficiency or disturbance of the balanced state at all. M1en we 
16 Aristotle, r~agna Moralia, 1205 b, 7. The translation is 
taken from A. K. Griffin, Aristotle's PSlChOlOf of Conduct, (Lon-
don, 1931)" p. 35. Whether the lAa~ni' Moral1a s an authentic work 
pf Aristotle is doubted by many 8C101ars at present. 
17Ar1stotle, Rhetoric, I,ll, 1369 b, 33. The translation is 
again GrIffin's, p; 35. 
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are in our natural state we take pleasure 1;:1 what is pleasant in 
itself; when we are being restored to it, in things not pleasant 
in themselves. In short, pleasures are not processes of bsaoming 
but activities. Furthermore, only some of them are incidental to 
processes, namely, those that accompany the restoration of our na-
ture; the others are incidontal to action. Therefore, pleasure is 
not a sensible process of restoration but "unimpeded activity of 
the na.tural state. nlB 
The treatment given pleasure in Book X of the Nicomachea.n 
Eth:hc.:!! is more complete and seems to belong to Aristotle's mature 
years. He not only criticizes the views of others19 but states his 
own doctrine positively.20 PleD.sure, he says, is like seeing in 
that it is complete at each moment of its existence; it does not 
become any more perfeot in quall ty by lasting lonseI'. Therefore 
it cannot be a movor;·16nt or a process of transition; for all move-
ment takes tirae, airas at a certain end, and is complete only when 
it has attained its end. Each p~n~t of' a movement is incomplete and 
is different in kind from the othel" parts and from the Whole. 
Pleasure, however, 1s perfect in each moment, as is evident from 
the fact that being ploased does not take time. Besides, we cannot 
18Ar1stot1e, Nioomaohean Ethics, VII, 12" 11.53 a, 14, The stu ... 
dent's Oxford Aristotle, trans. w. n. Ross (tondon, 1942), v:- ---!There are no numbers for the pages in this edition.] 
19Ibiq., X, 1, 1172 at 19 - X, 3, 1174 a, l2. 
20Ib1d., X, ), 1174 a, 13 - X, 5, 1176 a, 29. 
13 
be said to ~ pleased quickly or slowly, though we :nay become 
pleased quickly or slowly. If pleasure were a tr~1sition, a resto-
:r'ation, it would be infel"ior to that in which it culminates, and 
while we were pleased we would be restless till we reachod the 
state to which pleasure leads. But pleasure is in fact something 
complete 1n itself and satisfactory in every moment of itself, jus 
li1(e the activity of perception or of thoug,ht. 
It will be remembered that Aristotle defined pleasure in Book 
VIr as "the unimpeded activity of' the natural state." In an impor-
tant passage in Book X he distinguishes pleasure from activity; he 
recognizes a difference between it and genuine activities like 
those of seeinr; and thinldng. 21 Pleasure Is not 00 methlng that we 
do but a sort of crowning perfection that attaches to tho doing of 
things. This distinction is a notable advance over Book VII. The 
passage is worth quotinG. "Pleasure completes the activity not as 
the corresponding state does, by its immanence, but as an end whic 
supervenes, as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of 
their age. So long, then, as both the intelligible or sens1.ble ob-
ject and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they 
2lJean Leonard, S.J" distincuishes two Aristotelian views of 
pleasure in trie Nic02nachean Ethics. One is found in Book VII, 
where Aristotle seems to identifI pleasure and actiVity. The othe 
is found in Books II and X, where pleasure is described as a 21"0-
ReItt of m1 activity. Leonard concludes that Books II and X were WI" t en about the s~ue time, while Book VII is earlier. In arguin 
for the similarity of Books II and X, he cites two passages from 
Book II, chapter 3: 110 b 4 and 110/.j. b 15. He compfu'os these wit 
Book X, chapters [~and respective X See ea Leonard, S. J., !!!!. 
, . .. -
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should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activlty.ff22 He 
also makes a distinction between the kinds of pleasure tb,at is more 
exact and detailed than the one in Book VII. It runs as follows: 
For they [pleasure and activity] seem to be bound together 
and not to admit of separation, since without activity 
pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed 
by the attendant pleasure. For this reason pleasures seem, 
too, to differ in kind. F'oI' things different in kind are, 
we think, completed by different things-and similarly we 
think that activities differing in kind are completed by 
things different in kind. 110w the actl vi ties of thou[')'lt 
differ from those of the senses, and both diifor among 
themselves, in kind; so, therefore, do the pleD.su:t>es that 
complete them. This may be seen, too, from the fact that 
each of the pleasuros is bound up with tho activity it 
completes~3 For an activity is intensified by its proper 
pleasux·e. 
In view of the doctl~ine in Bool{s VII and X of the NioorIlachean 
Ethics the following definition of pleasure would seom to represent 
the mind of Aristotle. "Pleasure is the croVln:tng perfection of the 
unimpeded activity of the natural, balanced state of a being." 
With the presentation of Aristotlets doctrine on tho nature of 
pleasure the Vlork of the first chapter of this thesis is complete. 
A brief slliru~ry of its main points will not bo out of place. 
The purpose of this thosis is to discovel" and pre3ent St. 
Thomas's answer to the question, "What is pleusure?Tf Investigatl01 
has shown that St. Thomas has four more or less extended treatment I 
of pleasure in his writings, each in a major V'tork and each in a di11-
22Arlstot1e, :Ucomachean Ethics, X, 4, 1174 b 31 - 1175 a 1, 
trans. aoss, ~ Studpont'!!. Q.xford Aristotle, V. 
23~., 1175 a 20-31. 
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ferent context. These four works will be tho primary sources for 
this study and will be taken up in their chronolo;:::ical order, as 
follows: the C,ornrnentarl 2a ~ Sentences, the De Veri tatE:!, the ~­
mentar:t,: .2!! ~ Nicomachean Ethics, and the PrimB; Secundaj! of the 
Summ~ Theologiae. 
St. Thomas himself considers it useful in understanding the 
problem to advert to the Platonic and Aristotelian views on tho 
nature of pleasure. To Plato, pleasure was "becoming," an aCOOln-
panying phenomenon of transitions and developnents and not fully 
real. For Aristotle, pleasure was the crowning perfection of the 
unimpeded activity of the natural state of a being. And now for 
the view of St. Thomas. 
CHAPTER II 
DELECTATlq AND PASSIO 
In a textual and exegetical study the question of terminology 
Is of primary importance. RecognizinG this, chapter two will at-
tempt to clarify and define the two key terms that will come up 
again and again in this study. Both terms are widely used by St. 
Thomas and not always with the same meaning, a situation which 
could lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Therefore, before 
undertaking the study proper, it seems best to obviate these pos-
sible difficulties. 
It must first be determined what \"JO I'd St. Thomas uses for 
pleasure. It seems that thore are five possibilities: delectatio, 
t3audium, exultatlo, laetiti~, and jucW1ditas. Investigation has 
shown that delectatio is the generic term, while the other four are 
species. This is very clear in the Prima Secundae, where St. Tho-
mas quotes Avlcenna with approval: "Respondeo dicend~~ quod gaudiun 
ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo ~ Anit.1E!, est quaedam species delee-
tationis. ffl In the reply to the third objection to the same arti-
lThornas Aquinas, s.un1Jua ,!:heolo{;!::.~a~, I-II, 31, 3 c, ad. Petrus 
Caramello (Turin, 195'0). This VID rli: will heroafter be l"eferred to 




ole Thomas says: "Ad tertIum dioendurn quod alia nomIna ad deleota-
tionem pertlnentia, aunt imposita ab effectibus delectatlonls: nam 
laetlt1a Imponltur a dilatatione cordla, ac ai diceretur lat1tia; 
exultatio vera dloltur ab exterioribus signia deleotationis interI-
orIs, quae apparent exteriua, inquantum scilioet interius gaudium 
pros1lit ad exteriora; juounditas vero dioitur a quibuadam apeol-
allbu8 laetitiae signia vel effectibua. Et tamen omnia ista nomi-
na videntur pertinere ad gaudium: non enim utlmur eis nisi in 
naturis rationalibus."2 
The last sentence of this quotation brings us to an important 
distinction. Although Thomas says that delectati2 1s the generio 
term tor pleasure, he usually restricts its meaning to pleasures 
of the sense appetite; s;aud1wn 1s the term used in speaklng of 
pleasure of the rational appetlte, especially in the later works. 
This 1s olear from the body of the a~tlole whloh has just been 
'. quoted, where Thomas says: "Delectamur:' 8nlm et in his quae natur-
allter ooncupisoimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae conouplsclmu! 
secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudil non habet looum nisl In delec-
tatlone quae consequltur rationem: unde gaud1um non attrlbulmus 
brutls animallbus, sed solum nomen deleotationls.",3 
Thus far only the Prima Seoundae has been used to determine 
the Thomistlc term for pleasure_ It will be remembered that thls 
2!_!., I-II, 31, 3 ad ,3. 
3Ibld., In corp. 
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was the fourth or the four ~ajor sourcea. What about the other 
three? A quotation from the earliest of them, the Co~nentarz ~ 
~ Sentences, will show that tho doctrine is similar, even though 
it is not expressly stated that eaudium is a anacies of qelectatio. 
"[G]audium at delectatio licet haboant unum objectum secund~~ rem, 
non tamen est unum objectum secundum rationem. Bonura enim conju!lc-
tum realiter facit delectationem; sed conjunctmu secundum apprehen-
sionem facit gaudlum. Laetitia vero, exultatio at jucunditas sunt 
idem quod gaudium, nisi quod oxprirnu.nt quosdam gaudii effectus, ut 
dictum est.,,4 Two things in this passage are noteworthy. First, 
the distinction here made between delectatio and gaudiu.m again as-
signs delectatio to the sense appetites, but gaudium is said to 
arise when a being knows that it is in possession of some good ob-
ject. The kind of knowledge 1s not speoified, so gaudium is not 
restricted to the intellectual appetite. The solution to this 
question in the Sentences indicates only that conju.."1ctum z:eall tep 
means "physically" while conJu,IlctW!! secund.um apprehe:qsione~ means 
C' 
"intentionally.lf=' Second, laetitia, exultatio, and jucundita:!! are 
again called effects of gaudium. These brief cor.~nents by no means 
exhaust the doctrinal importance of this passage, and it will come 
up for more detailed consideration in the next ohapter. 
To surn up briefly, the generic term for pleasure used by St. 
4rn IV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. J.~, ad 1. 
- -
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Thomas is delectatl0, though in practice this word 1s frequently 
restricted to pleasure of the sense appetites. Gaudium is a spe-
cies of pleasure, is restricted to :::nean pleasure of the rational 
appetite in later works, but ca~ also rofor to the pleasure arisine 
from the knowledce that a 800d has been acquired. ~titi~,~­
tatio and jucunditas are effects of' SB;,udium and take their names 
from the speclf'ic effects produced. In pass inc it might be well 
to remark that delectatio is usually translated as "pleasure" and 
saudiu.l1! is rendered" joy. t. 
The term :e.assiq, will be of importance because St. Thomas twice 
asks !futrum. delectatio si t passio," first in tho Cornmentarz .2..n ~ 
Sentences, and again in the Prima ~ecundae. In both instances the 
answer is in the affirmative. St. Thomas also speal<:s of delectatlQ 
as pasaio in the other two primary sources of this study and in 
other works as well. But simply to translate passi'?, as "passion" 
when it is applied to pleasure would be w1wlse, for pas~ may 
moan not only "passiontt but considerably. more. Besides, pleasure 
does not seem to be a passion as wo understand that word today, but 
rather a feeling or an emotion. Tho distinction between the terms 
"pa.ssion" and "emotionn as used by modern philosophers and the tern: 
l?assio as used by St. Thomas is well expressed by Father Joseph Le 
Rohellec. 
Les philosophes modernes distinguent entre emotiop. et 
tass!on. Lt emotion d6signerait un mouvement SUQit et momen-
ano; ia passion desi~erait un mouvement affectlf prolonge, 
en1"&.oine par l' habitude et devenu uno sec(mde nature. Au. 
dire de.plusieurs, los paSSions seraient des inclinations 
pervertie. --Saint Thomas, au contralre, prenant le terms 
------------------------------------~~----
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passion dans un sens plus general, parce que plus etymologi-
que et plus metaphysique, ll.li .fait sir;nifier tout acte de 
llappetit senSlible, qutil soit violent ou calme, rapide ou 
prolonge. • •• [E]n tout cas 18. passion au sens thomiste 
no peut. janlB.is desAgner una b.abi tude, elle siE71ifie essenti-
ellemont uno acte. 
st. Thomas, says Lo Rohellec, uses tho word 12,33Sio in a sense that 
includes, at least to so:ne extent, what tho moderns moan by both 
passion and emotion. Thomas differs, however, because for him pas-
.!!2 always moans the act and not the mood or habit which the term 
"passionll now implies in its technical sense. 
The meaning of Eassio in St. Thomas as r~iven by I.e Hohellec, 
"tout acte de l'appetit sensible,1I cannot now be accepted as the 
final definition of the word as applied to delectatio but it will 
serve as a startinG point. For the sake of clarity and accuracy 
it will be necessary to work out from the toxt of St. Thomas the 
chiof meanings of :eass:I;,o, so that it may be determined which of 
these meanings applies when Thomas says tldelectatio est passio." 
The VI) rk of this part of the second chapter will be applied througb-
out the thesis and as early as the beGin~1ing of the third chapter, 
for Thomas begins his treatrnent of pleasure in the Commentar~ 2a 
.!?l!2 Sentenoes with the question "utrll."U deleotatio sit passio. 1f 
To make a thorough study of 129.s8io in St. Thomas would be a 
thesis in itself. 7 The study underta.lren here, since it is only a 
6R• P. Joseph La Rohellec, "La Theorle des Passions chez Saint 
Thomas," Problemes Philosophique~, eds. C. Larnicol et A. Dhellem-
mes, e.s.s., (ParIs, 193~), p. 3Lt4. 
7Suoh a thesis has been written. See Kenneth M. Kunert, S.J., 
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means to an end, cannot be long or exhaustive, and must oonfine it-
seli' to a very few works of St. Thomas. Aocordingly, the treatment 
Given in De Veritate, question 26, "De passionibus animae," w111 
serve as the major source, with an oooasional reference to the 
S~~a Theologiae for the sake of clarity. 
The first article in question 26 of ~ Veritate is entitlod 
"utrum anima separata a corpore patiatur." At the very begirL'1ing 
of the body of the article Thomas remarks: "Respondeo d1cendum, 
quod ad evidentiam hujus quaestionis et sequent1u,"ll soire oportet 
quid proprie sit passio. n8 Here, then, we are at the heart of the 
invostir:ation. Thomas continues: 
Soiendum est igitur, quod nomon passionis dupliciter surnitur: 
communi tel' et propria. Communitor quidem dioitur passio 1'0-
coptio alioujus quocurnque modo; et hoc sequendo significatio-
nen1 vocabuli: nam passio diel tur a patin graeee, quod est re-
cipere. Proprio vero dieitur pasaio seeundmn quod actIo et 
passio in motu consistunt; prout scilicet aliquid reoipitur in 
patiente per viam motus. Et quia omnia lllOtus est intel" oon-
traria, oportet illud quod reoipitur in pl-tionte, esse oon-
trarium alioui quod a patiente abjicitur."J 
The general meaning of .:easslo, then, is a reception of Eny kind in 
the being affected by the action of an agent. But properly speak-
ing it t"leans a ohan(:,;e caused by transient action. This change 1'0-
aul ts in the reception of S) me quality or pert'ection which foroes 
"The !ifetaphysios of the Passions aooording to the Doctrine of St. 
Thomas Aquinas," Unpublished Masterfa Thesis (Loyola University, 
Chicago, 1953). The writer is greatly indebted to this work for 
much of the material in this second part of' Chapter II. 
BThomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 26, 1 0, 5th Turin ad. (Turin, 
1927). This will be referred to hereafter as De Y!£. 
9Ibid. 
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out its contI'ary. Therefore in its pI'oper and more restricted 
sense passl0 inoludes the notions of' motion and contrariety. 
In a later WOI'k, the ~rima ~ of the S~~a Theologiae, St. 
Thomas goes beyond this definition, enlargine and clarifying it. 
Note that the order has been reversed, so that Eassi~ eroRrie is 
spoken of first. 
Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dioltur. Uno 
modo proprie: at sic pat1 dicitur quod a sua naturali disposi-
tiona romovetur. Paasio enim est effectus act1onis: in rebus 
autem naturalibus contraria ar;unt et patit:mtur ad Invieem, 
quorum unum removet alterum a sua natural! d1sposltione. 
-Alio modo, dioi tur passlo communi tar, seoundw'!1 quamoumque 
mututlonem, et1am s1 pertineat ad perfectlonem naturae; siout 
intelligere vel sentire diel tur Eati quod(~arl1.10 
The important advance in this passaCe is that the notion ofeassio 
proDrie has been ohanged to mean the removal of a being from its 
natural state or disposition, whereas in ~ V~ritate Thomas said 
that a being undergoes :eassio propria whanever it receives the con-
trary of oomethinc; already possessed. In other \'0 rds, the notion 
of oontrariety is not insisted upon in this present passaee. This 
differenoe wi 11 be returned to latel'. 
Another point to be notioed is that St. Thomas refers 2assio 
~ommuniter even to perfeotions of intellection and volition. It 
will be of help to find out how these two different kinds of passio 
may be found in a being. In ~ ~eritate Thomas says: 
Paeaio 191tur primo modo oommuniter aooepta invenitur in 
anima, at in qllallbet oreatura, eo quod omnis oreatura habet 
aliquid potentialltatis adm.ixtum, ratione cUjUS omnis oreature 
10 S.T., I, 97, 2 o. 
- -
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subsistens est alicujus receptiva. Pass10 ve:r'o secundo modo 
accepts. non invenitur nisi ubi est Motus et contrarietas. 
Motus autem non Invenitur nIsi 1n aorporibus at contrarletas 
formarum vel qualitatum in salls generabillbus et corruptibll-
ibus.. Unde sola hu:jusmodi propria hoc modo pat! possunt. 
Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo -;:>ati non potest: et 
si etlam. aliquid raoipiat, non tamen hoc fit per tltansMuta-
tlonom a. oontrario In contrarlul1l, sed p~r simplicem af;entis 
influxum, slcut aer illmninatur a sole. 11 
~eoording to this explanation, any being composed of act and poten-
cy can be a subject of J.'!assi£ cOn1muniter, for any change from po-
tency to act can be called Eassio in this broad sense. In its pro-
!per sense, however, J2.assi~ includes the two characteristics of mo-
ition and contrariety. Motion is found only in beings which have 
~odies; contrariety of forms is found only in beings subject to 
I,o;eneration and corruption. Therefore passl0 proprie can refer only 
ito bodies and to bodily chances and modifications. 
Paasio in its broad, general meaninc (cpmmuni tel") cannot un ... 
~ergo division, for then it would not extend to all cases of ohange 
frroIll potency to act. But in its strict sense (aroprie) it is fur-
~her distinguished in the PrimB:, Secundae. Here we find a triple 
~ivision of the term Eass~~ going from the general sense to the 
~ost strict. Note that this naw distinction returns to the point 
~ade earlior that a being can undergo Rassio Eropri"~ whenever It is 
removed from its natural disposition. 
Pati dlcitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communlter, secundum quod 
orone recipere ost pati, etaim s1 nihil abjiciatur a 1"6: stout 
ai dieatur aerem pati, quando illwn.inatur. Hoc autem magiS 
propria est perfici quam pati. --Alio modo dicltur pati pro-
ll~ Y!£., 26, 1 c. 
prie quando aliquid reclpltur cum alterlus abjectione. Sed 
hoc contingit duplicitor. Qunndoque anir.1 abjicitur id quod 
non est conveniens rei: siout cum oorpus animalis sanatur, 
dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, aecrltudlne abjecta. 
-Alio modo, quando e convol"'SO contingit siout aogrotare di-
citur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abjocta. Et 
hic ost propriissimus modus passionls. Nam pati dicitur ex 
eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem: quod auter;1 recedlt ab 
eo quod est sibi conveniens maxima videtur ad aliud trahi. 12 
According to this triple division, ~~ in its strictest sense 
involves the loss of oonlething which is proper to the boine receiv-
ing the action of the agent, sinoe in this type the patient is 
especially drawn to the agent oausing the ill effect. St. Thomas 
mentions sickness as an example of this :eassio Eroprilssim~. 
Thel:"'6 is also a less strict though still proper meaning of 
the term Eassio. In this meaning the patient loses somothing not 
proper to itself in order to gain something whj.ch is properly its 
own, and the example given is tho return to good health from sick-
ness. This is still passio Erop~i_t! because there is motion causine 
the reception of one contrary with the consequent loss of its op-
posito. But in this case the thing lost is not pl"toper to the beinE 
underGoing the 12assio, while the thin£, received is proper and fit-
ting to it. 
One further distinction re.':lains to be made. It is the dis-
tinction made by St. Thomas between 12assio corEoral~s and 12o.38io 
animalis. This new distinction will be so en to apply to the two 
divisions of I~assio EroEl'ie that have just boon discussed. 
I .. II, 22, 10. 
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In looking at the terminology of this new distinction, one is 
lad to think that EasSio ~n1mal~~ would refer in rome way to acts 
of intellection, volition and sensation. These acts, however, have 
already been placed under RaBsio c.o~':1qni tel', tho most general mean-
ing of the term. The new distinction refers to pa8s10 proprie with 
its notes of motion and contrariety, as the following quotation 
makes clear. 
Alio modo dicitur pa8sio propria, quae consistit in ab-
jectiono unius contraril at alterlus rocept;ione per v1am 
transmutatlonis; et 11io modus passlonis animae convenire non 
potest nisi ex. corpo:r~e; at hoc dupliei ter. Uno modo secundwn 
quod unitur corpori ut forma; et sic oompat1tur oorpori pati-
ent! pass:Lone corporal1. Alio modo prout unitur ut motor; at 
sic ex operatione animae transm~tatio fit in corpore, quae 
quidem passio dic1tuI' a.nimalis. :3 
In this distinction 'rhomas 1s spoa1t!nr; of the two ways in wh ich 
Easslo, EI'oprie can pertain to the soul. In both of these ways the 
EassiC!. pertains to tho soul in and through its union with the body 
and not directly. 
In the first way, pas3~ pertains to the soul in so far as it 
1s united to the body a.s its substantial form. Because of this 
substantial union the soul qomnat1tl!.r:: that is, it underCoes the 
sa.me thinss that the body undoI'Coos. ~rhis ;;1a.nner of "compassion" 
Is called passi? ~o£Eoralis. 
In the second way, ,Rassio portains to the soul in that it is 
united with the body as its mover, as the source of the body's mo-
tion and the prino:Lple of its action. In this case tho soul is 
13De Y.!U:., 26, 3 Erin. 
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considered not only as the substantial form of the body but also 
as the form giving the body and the composite the power to act. 
Thus the soul throW':.h its various operations is the cause of bodily 
changes. This typo of bodily change in which the soul is involved 
as movor Thomas calls ~ssio anlmal~s. 
With this distinction the 11.0 rl{ of Chapter II is complete and 
a brief summary is in order. The generic term for Dloasure used by 
St. Thomas is deleotati~. But quite often, though not always, de-
-
lectatio is restricted to mean pleasure of the sense appetite and 
Igaudium is employed in speaking of: pleasure of the intellectual ap-
petite. La~~iti~, ~~ultati~, and jucunditas are effects of: gaudium 
Five meanings of: the term Eassl0 were discussed. First there 
lWas t he most general meaning, Etassio communite~, which extends to 
any change from potency to act, even \then the chanGe involves the 
perfectlnc of a being as in intellection, volition and sensation. 
The second meaning of Ellssio, the proper sense or Eassio Eroprie, 
was seen to involve the two notos of motion and contrariety. St. 
Thomas then divided this second meaning into rassio Eropriissime 
and pl1ssio minus proprie. In the most propor senso Etlssio denotes 
the loss of ro metlling proper to a beine receiving the action of an 
agent. In its less proper sense :eassio denotes the loss of some-
thing not pl~opeX' to a being when it cains something which is pro-
parly its own. 
A final distinction, applyinc to both divisions of ~!!!E. 
12roEI~~, was found in the terms Eassl0 c.orEoralls and passto a11i-
27 
malls. The soul is said to underco or partioipate in (comEa~~) 
Dassi~ cOrporslis when it is affooted because of its substantial 
union with the body as tho substantial form of the oomposi to. The 
soul is said to undergo Eassio animalis when it acts as mover in 
the various operations of the comjlosite whioh result in bodily 
chances. 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the writer does not mean 
to imply t!lSt these are all the meanings and distinctions of the 
term Esssio in the writings of St. Thomas. Only those distinotions 
and meaninGs were discussed which will aid in the study of the pri-
mary souroes in tho succeeding ohapters. Now that the way has been 
prepared, it is time to turn to the first of the primary sources, 
the COJ:ll!i1.entarz 2!l ~ Sentenoes. 
CHAPTE!R III 
PLEASURE IN THE COMMENTARY ON TH~ SENTENCES 
.. _ .. - ........-- -..;.~.;..;;.;..~ .... 
The principal discussion or pleasure in the C,om::1entarx £!! the 
Sentences occurs in Book IV, distinction 49. This distinotion is 
conoerned wi th "the rewards or the good, tI and is divided into five 
questions. The first question treats beatitude; the second, the 
vision of God, "in which beatitude principally consists Tf ; the 
third, pleasure, "whioh formally cOl"'apletes beatitude"; the fourth, 
the gifts which are contained in beatitude; the fifth, the aureo-
lae, "by whioh beatitude is perfected and adorned."l 
The third question is divided into five artioles whioh treat 
of the nature of pleasure, its causes, its relation to sadness, 
the morality of pleasure and the relation between spiritual and 
corporal pleasures. The exact titles of the five articles are 
interesting, for they throw light on the viewpoint and approach of 
St. Thomas. The first artiole asks !!whether pleasure is passion; 
the seoond, tfwhether the only oause of pleasure is an unimpejed 
operation of a habit oonf'orrnable to nature"; the third, "whether 
sadness is contrary to pleasure tf ; the f'ourth, "whether every pleas-
lIn IV ~., 49, 1 prin. The Parma edition of the 0:eet:! 
Omnla,Vol. VII, ha.s been used throughout. , 
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ure is good"; and the fifth, "whether bodily pleasures are stronger 
than spiritual ploasures. n2 
st. Thomas begins his inquiry into the nature of pleasure by 
asking "whether pleasul~e is a passion. ,,3 This is tho flrst article 
where his viewpoint is more metaphysical than psycholo[':ical. He 
opens his reply by remarking that a thing [~alns stability and vigor 
IWhen it acquires a perfection proper" to itself. Now a beine can 
be moved toward a proper perfection in two ways. The first is by 
natural inclination wh:i.ch requires no knowledf'"e, as when a stone 
~alls. This is called natural movement.. But a being can be moved 
itoward a perfection proper to itself in another way which requires 
~hat the being be endowed with the power of cognition. This seoond 
~ay is oalled either animal appetite4 or intelleotual appetite, de-
pending on whether the cognition involved is sensory or intelleotu-
al. Thomas then points out a similarity betweon natuI'al movement 
and animal appetite. 
[5 ]lout in terminatione motus naturalls est quaedam vl/?:oratio 
naturalis ejus quod movetur, ita in 8.ssocutlone perfect:i.onis 
in quam tendit appetitus anlmalls, est quaedam quietatio ip-
sius, seu vic-oratio ejus, praesupponens cognltionem perfec-
tionis jam canjIDlctae, siout appetitus praesupponebat co[~i-
2Ibid., q. 3 prin. 
Jlbi,d., a. I prine For the sake of uniformity und convenience 
the term fiassio will he:peafter be translated as "passion, tf Uote 
that in t Is article Thomas is determining whether pleasure falls 
under the category of passion rather than giving it a psyohological 
classifioation. 
4"anlmal appetite" translates -the Thomistic phrase 8.ppetitus 
anlmalis. 
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tlonem perfeotlonls nondum habitae; et taIls vigor sive quie-
tatio appotitus vocatur doloctatio; unde et1aJ:l COl1t:1ontator 
dicit in 10 ~th1corum quod delectatio est quaedam superflori-
tic naturae. 
In the passaGe just quoted occurs tho first descript:lon of pleasure 
It is called v1f":;or s1 v:.~ 9,uletutio apoeti tus, VCL loh might be trans-
I. lated "a feeling of satisfaction of the appetite."O Thomas makes 
an important point when ho says that pleasure presupposes 1010wledge 
of the acquired perfection, just as appetency pl'1esupPosGS know-
!ledge of the perfection to be acquired. It is noteworthy that only 
animal appetite is compared to natural motion. In dealinG with in-
tellectual appetite Thomas says: 
Est autem duplex appetitus, sicut et cognitio, scilicet sen-
sitivae at intellectivae partis. Appetitus autem sensitivae 
partis est virtus in organa corporali, at ost i~nediatum prin-
cipium corpora11s motus; unde omnia quae accidunt in appetltu 
sensitivo sunt conjuncta cum quadam transmutatione corporall; 
quod non accidlt In his quae sunt in appetltu Intellectivo, 
nisi passione la1'[';e accepta, et Improprie, ut supra dictum 
est; unde delectatio quae est In appetitu sensitivo quaedam 
passio est; non autem delectatio quae ost in intel1ectivo~ ni-
si passione large accepta.7 
Three things in this passage deserve special note. First, it seems 
5In IV sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1. 
- -
6In the very beginning of the solution from which this passage 
Is taken we read: TlQuaelibet res quando portincit ad pl"oprla:n per-
fectionOlll, consequitur stabilimentum et vlf.oI·em; sieut cor'")ora 
quando perveniunt ad termino! motus sui natural is, quia in loco 
naturali conservantur." (Stress supplied.) At first glance the 
terms viGor and visoratio seem opposed to 9,uietatl,o and atablli-
mentum •. Yet on second thought they soem to be an attemp€ €o de-
scribo the dynamic and static aspects of what we mean by a "sense 
of well-being" or the feeling that "itts good to be alive." 
7Ibid. 
31 
pleaI' that the appetites, both sensitive and intellectual, are the 
seats of pleasure. Second, Thomas uses the term a.ppetitu~ sensl-
ti vus here instead of apoeti tus 8.,n1111a118, yet he seems to be ta11!::-
in,S about the same thing when he uses these terms. The rest of thi 
artiole and the succeeding ones lend support to the oonolusion that 
the terms a1"e synonoruous. Thil"d, a distination is ~~lade between 
pleasure of the sense appetite and pleasure of the intellectual 
appetite. The sensa appetite is a material faoulty and is the im-
mediate principle of bodily movement. Therefore movement of the 
sense appetite will necessarily involve bodily movement and gJve 
rise to a passion in the strict sense, n8.8sio 2roErie. The intel-
lectual appetite, on the other hand, is an im.ma.terial faoulty and 
hence is not moved in the strict senso. Further, it is not an im-
mediate principle of bodily movoment, so that its operation does 
not necessa.rily involve bodily change. Therefore a. movement of the 
intellectual a.ppetite will be a pa.8sion only in the wide sense, 
nassiq c9~muniter. 
But Thomas has said that pleasure is a quiet inc of the appe-
tite, not a movement of it. ilow then can pleasure be a paSSion? 
The objection is answered as follows: "Non cst incol'lvcnicms motum 
per accidens termlnari ad alium m.otum. • •• Delectatio ergo, In-
quantum hujusmodl, semper conslstit in allqua terminatione motus. 
Sed tamen quia in terrninatlone motus appeti tiv-i con8urtit quldam 
motus, in quo passio animalis conslstit; ideo pa.ssionem incsse 
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~ccidit deleotationi; sed inest per se deleotationi sensitlvae. ltli 
jJ.1ven here, however, Thomas does not explioitly assert that pleas-
ure is a passion. He rather says that the quieting of the appe-
ti te gi ves l~lse to a mover:lent in which the psychical passlon9 oon-
sists. Nor does he say that the termination of the movement of the 
appetite is a passion. The use of the verb i~csse., "to belong to, 
to be bound up with" instead of ~ is signifioant. 
Thomas's hesitation to oall pleasure, evon of the sense apps-
tite, a passion in the strict sense is further revealed in the 
follmtlng two passages. The first passage shows that pleasure Is 
unique among the passions bocause it consists in the termination 
of the movement of tho appetite. Discussing whether or not pleas-
ure is in time Thomas says: 
[E]tiam aliae animas passiones quantum ad id quod est ex parte 
animae, non sunt in tempI's nisi per accidens, inquantum 
scilicet eis conjungltur motus ex parte corporis; tamen de-
lectatl0 magis habet rationem quod non sit in tempore quam 
aliae passiones: quia nliae passiones cOl1sistunt in appetitu 
secundum quod tendit in aliquid, siout ira in vindictam et 
odium in nocumentum alterius; sed delectatl0 consistit in 
appetltu secundum quod ejus motue in suo appetibili adepto 
8 Ibid., ad 1. 
-
9This 1s the writerts translation of Enssio nnimalis. It will 
be remembered from chapter II that this 1s the type of passio the 
soul underGoes whon it acts as sJlover of the body and tho prInciple 
of its action. It would be very helpful to Imow more about this 
movement inYlhich the psychical passion consists and which has its 
orisin in the quieting of tho moveClent of the appeti to. Some light 
on the point Is given in the followlnJ passa~e from tho reply to 
the next objection. "Operatlonem appetitus sensitivi consequitur 
quaedam corporalis transmutatl0 secundum dllatationem et constric-
tlonem cordis et alia hujusl11odi.!f In TV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1 
ad 2. - -
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terminaturj omnis autem terminus motus non est in tempore, 
sed in instanti. lO 
In the second passae6 Thomas says that the bodily chan:::os 
which follow upon the op~ration of the sonse appetite are the pas-
sIon stl'>ictly so called. "Quamvis operatio, inquantum operatio, 
non at t passioj tamen Dotest habel"e passionem annexam, vel sicut 
praocedentem, vel sicut subsequenteml • •• sed ut consequentemj 
sicut operationem appetitus sensitivi consequltur quaedam corpora-
lis transmutatio secundum dilatationem et cOIlstrictionem cordis et 
alia hujusmodij at sic quamvis dolectatio sit circa operationem, 
tamen inquantum est delectatio sensitlva, est in passions quadam 
conslstens. nll 
In brief, St. Thomas simply does not call pleasure, even of 
the sense appetite, a passion in the strict senss. The reason is 
not far to seek. It will be remaln.bored from Chapter II that pas-
sion in the strict sense involves the notes of motion and contrar-
iety.12 Since pleasure is the termination of appetitive motion it 
cannot be a paSSion in the strict senss. But since pleasure is so 
closely oonnected \~th appetitive movement "est in passione quadam 
eonsistens." 
To make the picture complete, however, a briof passage which 
occurs in question 1 of distinction 49 cannot be overloolced. In 
~'N'STOW~ 
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101£ IV ~., 49, 3, 1, 3 sol. ad 3. 
llIbld., sol. 1 ad 2. 
12See above, pp. 21 and 22. 
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view of what is said there, it is surprising that St. Thomas does 
not take up the point in his major treatment of pleasure :in ques-
tion 3, which has just been discussed. The passage reads as fol-
loWS: 
[D]uplex est deleotatio. Una quae prlleoedit asseoutionem fi-
nis, et haec est ordinabilis in aliud: potest onlm ordinari 
ad porfectam operationem, inquantum. videlicet ilIa in quibus 
delectamur attentius agimus. Alia delectatio est quae con-
sequitur assecutionem finis; et ilIa efficitur per operationem 
quae fini conjungit: et idoo haec delectatio non est ipsa 
beatitudo, sed quaedara boatitudinis perfectio, et forma, ut 
supra dictum est. 13 
Thomas here indicates tha.t there is a certain plea.sure in the very 
movement of the appetite, before the desirablo object is gained. 
This mi,cht be callod a pre-delectation. It is impossible to say 
why this point is not tal{en up later when pleasure is explicitly 
treated. The point finds full development only in the Pri;.ma §!,-
cundae. A conjecture is that St. Thomas is reacting aGainst the 
Platonic doctrine of pleasure as a gonEn"ation or beco:ning. Allying 
himself with the Aristotelian pOSition that pleasure is the orown-
ing perfection of an unimpeded operation, he calls it the terr:1ina-
tion of the movement of the appetite instead of the movernent itself 
The Aristotelian influence comes out clearly when St. Thomas speaks 
of pleasure as "quaedam perfectio operationi superveniens, ut decor 
juventuti. tt14 This perfection is not tho form which specifies the 
operation, but one which 1s superadded in the manner of a secondary 
l3In IV ~., 49, 1, 2, sol. 2 ad 3. 
14I£!£., 3, 4, sol. 3. 
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porfection like health. Neither 1s pleasure the operation itself, 
but something destined to complete and perfect the operation. 1S 
Here the viewpoint is more psychological and there is no effort to 
assign pleasure to one of the oategories. 
St. Thomas is always mindful that pleasure is more a perfec-
tion than the suffering of change, or a.s he would put it, nest 
perfici plus quam pati."16 That is why he does not assign pleas-
ure to the category of £ass10 without reservation, usually in the 
form of a qualifying phrase or expression. He does, however, as-
sert that pleasure is passion in the wide sense, just as intellec-
tion, volition and sensa.tion, for example, are passions in the 
wide sense.17 
Now that the nature of pleasure in the Sentences has been de-
termined, an invostigation of its causes is the next step. Undoubt~ 
edly, a knowledge of the causes will throw more lisht on the nature 
of pleasure. 
St. Thomas devotes an entire artiole to the oauses entitled 
"Whether the only cause of pleasure is an unimpeded opel"ation of 
l5Ibid., ad 2 and 3. 
l6The reader may have the impression that too muoh stress is 
beine plaoed on pleasure ns a quieting or termination of the move-
ment of the appetIte. In addition to the passages already quoted, 
the following deserve consIderation. "Cum delectatio consistat in 
quietatione appetitus ••• " (In IV Sent., 1}9, 3, 2, sol. pri£.> 
"Conveniens enim adveniena perReit TdOu! conventt at quieta in-
clinationcm in illud: at haec quietatio, secundum quod est per-
cepta, ost delectatio." (~III Sent., 27, 1, sol. 2 ad 3.) 
17~~ IV ~., 49, 3, 1, sol. 3 ad 3. 
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~ habit conformable to nature. nlB He begins tho solution by rG-
:ull"i:ing that pleasure, in so far aa it is a passion, is oOTilmon to 
poth body and soul. 'l'herefore, like other things corrunon to body 
and soul, it wlll have a for'mal element from the soul and a mate-
rial element from the body. From. the material elem.ent, only how a 
be1ng is disposed to pleasure can be learned, but from the formal 
pause comes the knowled'e of how a being is actually pleased. 
The formal cause of any passion or operation is its object. 
~he object of pleasure is a suitable good that is possessed, "bonum 
conveniens conjunctum." st. Thomas reasons to this as follows. 
Since pleasure belonGS to the appetitive part of the soul, its ob-
ject must be some good, otherwise the appetltes "rvould not be moved. 
But sinoe pleasure belongs to an a:poet! te re:tLng in possession of 
~ts objeot, the objeot must be some suitable good that 1s posses-
Now this suitable possessed Good whioh is the proper objeot 
of pleasure must be some operation of the beine whioh is pleased. 
Three reasons are assigned. First, the ultimate perfeotion of a 
being or faoulty lies in its operations. Seoond, the suitable pos-
sessed good which oauses pleasure must be known as suoh, but it can 
be known only in and through some operation. Third, we come into 
oontact with goods throur):l the opel"ations of our faculties. Every 
eood which attracts us can be eained and satisfy our appetites on13 
througll the mediation of S) me operation. Thoref'ore, operations are 
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pf themselves the oause of' pleasure. 
l'fot every operation, however, is the cause of plcasul"e, but 
only those which arc unimpeded and proceed from habits; for an ac-
quired good wi 11 not af'for'd pleasure unless it is also sui table 
and natural. Operations are made suitable and "second-nature" 
through the formation of habits. Naturally, if an operation is 
impeded by hindrances from within or without it will give rise to 
~1 ttle if' any pleasure. "1fherefore, tf conoludes St .. 1l homaa, tfthe 
proper formal causa of pleasure is an unimpeded operation of a 
labit conformable to nature. fl19 
Having presented his positive doctrine, Thomas turns to answer 
!the obvious objection that there are many suitable goods for a 
Deinc besides its own operations. His ansv/er is that, while there 
~re indeed many suitable goods, pleasure is derived trom them only 
py means of some operation. The reason is that a boing comes into 
contact with goods outside itself' and becomes aware ot goods within 
itself only in and through operations; there is no other wo.y.20 
It should be noted tha.t in this reply St.. Thoraas has shifted 
bis ground somewhat. In the body of the article he spoke of opera-
tions as the formal causes of pleasure, since they are its proper 
object and specify the pleasure to be of one kind rather than an-
other. But in this reply he seems to be speakinG of opol"ations as 
19~., "Sic orgo causa fornmlis propria deleotationis est 
operatio oonnaturalis habitus non impecUta. tt 
20Ib1d., ad 1. 
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efficient oauses upon whioh pleasure follows as a kind of natural 
~omplel11ent. The following passage would seem to bear this out. 
It[D]alactatio anim operationem consequitur •• 
• • Ncc ilIa duo 
sunt consideranda quasi duo bona, sed quasi unum bonum. S10ut anim 
ex perfectione et perfectibili fit una res perfeota; ita ex deleo-
1iatione at operatione fit una operatio perfeota, quae ost re11c1-
~as; cum deleotatio sit operationis perfoctio. n21 
Another brief passage that will throw li[~'1t on this point is 
~he following. "The proximate cause or pleasure is an operation, 
Ibut the romote cause is the objeot of the operation; just as in the 
[pleasure of the blessed, • • • the proximate oause is the vision of 
pod, but the first oause is God."22 The oontext indicates that 
effioient causes are hore spoken of, for very rarely is there ques-
~ion of proximate and remote formal causes. 
The conclusion is, then, that operations are both rormal and 
~fficient causes of pleasure, but under difrerent aspect: formal, 
in so far as they are the objects of pleasure 
of a particular kind; effioient, in so far as 
through whioh a being oomes into oontact with 
~hich are suitable to itselr. 23 
21l.!! IV ~. t 49, 3, L~, sol. 3. 
22Ibid., a. 5, sol. 4. 
and speoify it to be 
they are the means 
and possesses goods 
23An interesting oomr1ent on this point is the following. 
"Operatio causat delectationcm partim in genere causae efficientis, 
inquantum deleotatio non orltur nisi mediante opera.tiona, ex qua. 
sequitur per natural em resultantlam, sicut passio sequitur ex 6S-
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The material cause of pleasure must be looked for in its sub-
ject. "The subject of pleasure and of all paSSions of the soul is 
the animal spirit, which is the proximate instrument of the soul 
in -the operations which are performed through the body.,,24 Exactly 
1~/hat St. Thomas means by s12iritus animalls cannot be dotermined, 
for the term is not further defined or B.mplified. 25 From the rest 
of the present article, however, it seems that the term is an at-
tel~lpt to explain what modern psychology calls the "bodily resonanoe 
pf an emotion. Thomas speaks of an abundanoe of those spirits 
which are the causes of the dilation of the heart, and, presumably, 
pi' faster pulse rate, more rapid breathing, and the like. One 
thing seems olear. St. Thomas is here thinking of pleasure as a 
passio ~imalis in whioh the soul is said to undergo paSSion be-
cause it acts as the mover of the body. 
sentia subjecti: partim in genero causae formal is, inquantum oper-
atio conveniens est objectum de1ectationis, eique speciem tribult: 
delectatur enim qulspiam non tantur.l de l"e bona, sed etiam de rei 
istius assecutlone at operations circa 111am. Priorem modum oausa-
litatis tradit B. Th. Q. 33, a. 4, ad 2. Posteriorem in IV Sent., 
dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2 c." Fr. Silvl1, COlllmentarii; !!! totam nrIiiim 
secunda.~, Antuerplae, 1714, p. 219 D. 
24In IV ~., 49, ), 2, sol. 
25S ohtltz t s Thomas-Lexikon and the Tabula Aurea give only two 
other references to spiri,tus anim~1is, neither of: which treat of 
its nature. However. this notIon is pr'obably derived from the 
stoic doctrine of pneuma, a hot, breath-like substa.l'lcC which was 
supposod to be tho prInciple of lifo. ArmstronG traces this doc-
trine throui,;,'h Aristotle and Plato back to the pre-Socratic "llving-
stuff." Copleston notes its appearance in Bernardino Telosio 
(1509-8B) and in Desoartes. See A. H. Armstrong An Introduction 
to Anciont PhilOSOPht (Westminster, ~'i:aryland, 1949T; pp. 1~~-23, . and Fre<!eri'Olt"C!oples on, S.J., A History: of Philosophi, (Westmin-
ster, Maryland, 1953), III, p. ~52. --
Only the final oause of pleasure now remains to be discovored. 
st .. Thomas does not explicitly mention the final cause of pleasure, 
IJrobably beoause it is easily doducible from what he has said about 
tthe nature of pleasure. For, as the orowning perfection of an un-
lampered operation, it seems clear that pleasure is of itself in 
rthe order of finality. However, the su1 table Good, the bonu..rn .2..212-
rveniens, may be looked upon as the final cause of pleasure, since 
~t attracts a being and causes it to place those acts and opera-
~ions which will put it in possession of the good and give rise to 
pleasure. 
Briefly, then, the four causes of pleasure are as follows: 
~ormal, unimpeded operations prooeeding from habits conformable to 
~ature; material, the animal spirit, whioh is the proximate instru-
pent of the soul in the operations which are performed through the 
~ody; effioient, the various operations which are the means through 
tRhich a. being comes into contact \vi th and possesses goods whioh are 
~uitable for itself; final, none needed strictly speakinG, for 
;>leasure is already in the order of finality, but suitable goods 
may be considered as final causes of pleasant operations. 
No aooount of the oauses of pleasure would be complete without 
a discussion of the role of lmowledgo in pleasure. Knowledp:e oan 
be said to be the cause of pleasul"'s in two ways.26 This is true 
f'irst, on the part of the thing that is known, as when a man comes 
26!a IV ~., 49, 3, 3, sol. 2 c. The word usod for know-
~adge here is apprehansio. 
r.------------. 
to know some good that is suitablo for himself and is pleased, pre-
sumably at the prospect of acquirinr:: the good. In this way know-
lodge is the cause of every pleasure, for the appetites are aroused 
through the knowledge of some good for the being. Second, know-
ledge is said to be the cause of pleasure on the part of the know-
ledge itself, as when a man is "pleased not by the thing known but 
by the very cognitive act throug;h which he knows the thing. In 
this second way, Thomas seems to be speaking of the operation of 
knowing as the object of pleasure. Therefore, knowledGe taken in 
this sense would be a fOl'1mal cause of pleasure, for the formal 
cause of pleasure is an operation as object, as has been seen. In 
the first way, considering knowledf;e from the aspect of the thing 
known, apprehension of the suitable good seems to be mOre a condi-
tion than a cause. !<'or unless the eood weI'e somehow known it could 
not stir tho appetites and aI'ouse deelI'e for itself. This seems to 
be st. Thomas's meaning when he says tt~t knowledge of the suitable 
is the oause of everl. pleasure. But he might also be :t'eferl"ing to 
the knowledze which makes a being aware that it is actually in pos-
session of the good it has sought aftel~ a.nd acquired; this too is I 
necessary oondition of pleasure. HowoveI', it should be bOI'ne in 
mind that pleasuI'e belongs to the appetitive powers, not to the 
approhenslve. 27 
Now that the role of knowledGe in pleasure has boen determinec 
27~n III ~., 15, 2, 1, sol. 2. 
st. Thomas's distinction between pleasure and joy can be more 
~aslly understood. Pleasure and joy have this in com~on, that thoy 
~re caused by the possession of some good that has been desired. 28 
Now a good or perfection can be possessed in two ways, physically 
(realiter) and throu[',:)1 knowledge (secundll;Jn apnrehensipneD!). When 
a [!,Ood is physically possessed, pleasure 1s experienced; when a 
;.:;ood is l~nown, joy arises. 29 'l'herefore joy is oonoel"ned with the 
lope of future e;oods and the memory of past goods as well as with 
those present, but pleasure Is concerned only with suitable goods 
~ctually pro sent and physically possessed. 
Some interesting applications of this distinction are made to 
~he various co~pitive powers and their operations. Because the ~­
torior senses apprehend only things physically present, we are said 
to be pleased by their operations. The i.nteriozt senses apprehend 
things both present and absent; therefore we both rejoice in and 
are pleased by their operations. One of the goods aotually present 
to the interior senses, and thus a source of pleasure, is their own 
operations. The same operations will also be a source of joy inas-
28~ IV ~., 49, 3, 1, sol. 4. In this disoussion of pleas-
ure and joy "to be pleased tJ translates delectari and Uto rejoice" 
translates r.audere. "pleasure,1t of course, translates q~lectatio 
and tr joy" tra11s1ates {:;audiwa. It is to be noted that joy is not 
restricted to mean pleasure of the intellectual appptlte here in 
the Sentenoes nor in the De Veritate. 
29Ibld., and ad 1. "Gaudium et delectatio lioet habeant unum 
objectuiii'Secundum rem, non tamen est unum objectum secundum ratio-
nem. Bonum enim conjunctum realitor fecit deleotationom; sed con-
junctum seoundum apprehensionclU tacit eaudium." 
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much as the interior senses know their own operations as well as 
the operations of the exterior senses. It se6ms that a parallel 
argument oould be made for pleasure in the operations of the intel-
leot, for these operations are surely present to the intelleot. 
But strangely enough the intellect is mentioned only onoe in this 
disoussion, and in an example, as follows. We are said to rejoice 
in the eating of sweets, for the interior senses and the intellect 
apprehend this as a suitable good for the exterior senses and for 
the composite. We are pleased also, of course, for the sweets are 
a good really present to the exterior senses. Therefore, the sa.me 
good oan afford both joy and plea.sure, for it oan be actually pos-
sessed through the operations of the exterior senses and possessed 
through knowledge by the operations of the interior senses and the 
intelleot. St. Thomas expr'ssses this as follows: 
"[I]dem est oausa delootationis et gaudil, sed non, eodem or-
dine: primo anim at per se est causa deloctationis; secundario 
vero est causa gaudii. liumquam en1m aliquid apprehensum. facit 
gaudlum, nisl inquantum aestlmatur ut conjunctum vel eanjun-
glbile secundum rem ad faoiendanl delectationemj et ideo con-junetio perfectlonis primo et per se facit deloctationem; sed 
inquantum apprehenditur ut delectationem faciens, tacit gau-
dium etiam quando delectationem actualiter non causat; undo 
delactatlo naturaliter prior est gaudio."30 
The basts of this distinction between joy and pleasure, then, is 
the way in which a good object 1s in the possession of a being. If 
the object is really present and lcnown throU[:",fl the exterior senses, 
pleasure will be experienoed. If an acquired or acquirable object 
30I b =h.<:!., ad 2. 
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is estimated to be a suitable good for the being or some of its 
facul ties by the ill 0.081 tat iva or the intellect or both, joy will 
be experienced. Therefore pleasure is oaused by the operations of 
th.e exterior senses and joy is caused by the operations of the in-
terior senses and the intellect when these facultios are in contaot 
with suitable objects. Whether St. Thomas here means to restrict 
delectatio to the enjoyment of material objects cannot be said with 
certitude. But on the basis of the distinction as given it seems 
that gau4ium. will be a part of every pleasant experience. The 
reason is that apprehension of a suitable object both as aoquirable 
and as acquircd is a necessary oondition for pleasure. 3l 
Another but very different distinction between pleasure and 
joy is made in Book III of the Conune~ta£z 2!! ~ S,ent,ence.s. This 
new distinction raises considerable diffioultIes, but it must be 
'Oresented in e;iving a complete and honest sumrnary of Thomistic doc-
trine on pleasure in the 3~ntences. It will also pave the way for 
much of the material to be seen in the next chapter on the 12!!. Ylli-
tate. 
-
Up to this point the doctrine has been taken exclusively f'rom 
Book IV of' the Sentences, where the t:;eneral oontext has been a dis-
oussion of' beatitude. This new distinction between pleasure and 
3lNobla maintains, and correctly it seems to the writer, that 
pleasure a.nd joy always involve one another, a.t least in som.e small 
degree. See H.-D. Noblo, O.P., "Le plaisir at 1& joie,« aSPT" V 
(19ll), 706. 
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joy oocurs in Book III where st. Tho:;tas treats of the human defeots 
~hioh Christ took upon Himself when He assumed a hU':lan nature. In 
iistinotion 15, question 2, artioles 1 and 3, Thomas discusses 
whether the body of Christ was able to suffer and whether He ex-
perienced aotual pain in His senses. It should be noted that only 
sense pleasure (delectatio ~ensibilis), not pleasure in genoral, 
is here distinguished from joy. The distinction is based on a oom-
lParison of pleasure with pain and of joy wi ttl SOl"ro\V. The way must 
!be prepared by a few short quotations, as follows. 
ItThe impression left in the oonoupisoible part from the pre-
senoe of good is oalled pleasure or joy; but the presenoe of evil 
is oalled sorrow (tristitia) or pain (qolo,r). How sorrow and pain 
differ has been indicated above in distinotion 15. Sense pleasure 
and joy differ in the same way."32 
Before turning to distinction 15, the following notes on the 
nature of sense pleasure will be helpful. "Sense pleasure is 
oaused by the possession of something suitable by the senses. • • • 
Complete sense pleasure is only in the perception of the sense of 
touch, just as pain is in its woundlnc. n33 
Now for the distinction between sorrow and pain, Which is the 
same as the distinction between joy and sense pleasure. "Because 
32la III ~., 26, 1, 3 sol. 
33.!lli.., d. 15, 2, 3, sol. 1. "De1ectatio sensibilis causatur 
ex oonjunotions convenientis secundum sensum. • • • Com.plete deleol-
tatio sensibilis est in sola perceptione tactus, siout dolor in 
laesione ejus. t1 
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rain beGins in wounding and is terminated in the porception of the 
sense of touoh, pain is there completed; but sorrow begins in ap-
prehension and is terminated in appetency; therefore pain is in the 
sense of touoh as in a subject, but sorI'OW is in the appetite. 
'Rrom this it is clear that sorrow is a psyohioal passion, but pain 
is a bodily passion."34 
Aocording to this distinction, sense pleasure is a bodily pas-
sion (passio cOrporal~,s), is in the sens~ as in a subjeot, and Is 
caused when the senses, especially the sense of touoh, come into 
contact with 8. suitable good. Joy is a psychical passion (28.s8io 
anim.ali8), is in the appetites as in a subject, and begins with 
iapprehension and terminates in appetency. 
Up to this time, Thomas has conSistently said that pleasure 
~elongs to the appetites, but here we find him stating that sense 
pleasure belongs to apprehensive powers, the five exterior senses. 
[rhere seem to be two possible explanations why St. Thomas here says 
that sense pleasure is in the senses as in a subjoot.The first 
~ould be that every faculty has a "natural appetite" to perform its 
pwn particular operation. 'rhus it is said that the eye, ror exam-
ple, has a natural tendency to see. When Ii perfect operation of 
Vision takes place, pleasure crowns that operation "siout quaedam 
superveniens finis. tt Therefore tho sense of Sight might be looked 
upon as tho seat of pleasure, the natural complement of its O\fn 




The second possible explanation would be to interpret this 
new distinction as follows: delactatio sonsibilia will arise when 
the operation of one or more of the exterior senses is the formal 
pause of a pleasant experience; eaudiutil will arise when the opera-
~ions of the other apprehensive powers are the formal oauso of 
pleasure. The following passage seoms to support this interpreta-
~ion, for it refers to sense pleasuro as belonging to the exterior 
pensea. "[G]audio opponitur directo tristitia.; delectationi autem 
ppponit~ dolor, secundum quod delectatio est in sensu exteriori, 
at pl"a.eoipue in tactu; sed seaundum quod est interiu8, non habet 
~liqu1d oppositum quam tristit1wm: posaot tamen habere, s1 asset 
nomen positum.n35 Mention is here made of another kind of pleasure 
besides ~electatio sensib1l1a. No name is civen to it, but some 
idea of its nature can be gained from the following passage. 
tr[SJicut delectatio distingultur a gaudiO, ita dolor a. tristitia, 
~t sic per oppositum trlstltia. respondeat gau4io, dolor varo deleo-
~ationi: sed quia dolor propria accipitur in sensu, at praecipue in 
sensu tactus: deleetatio etiam proprie loquendo se extendit ad in-
~erlores vires; ideo delectationi non solum dicimus opponi dolorem, 
sed etiam trlstltiam. n)6 This second kind or pleasure, then, ex-
tends to the interior apprehensive powers, presumably to the opera-
35!!! IV ~ •• 49, 3, 1, sol. h ad ,3. 
36 Ibld~, a. 3. sol. 1 ad 3. 
-
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tions of the interior senses and possibly even of the intellect. 
It is opposed to sorrow, while sense pleasure is opposed to pain. 
Thus there seems to be a sound basis for the interpretation that 
sense pleasure arises when the operation ot: one or more of tho 
exterior senses is the formal cause of a pleasant experience, and 
this interpretation t:urnishes a plausible explanation why St. 
Thomas says that aense pleasure is in the exterior senses as its 
subject instead of in the appetite. 
For all that, it must be admitted that the ditt:iculty is not 
tully solved. This now distinction betwoen ploasu.l'e and joy in 
Book III of the SenteI'l;oe.~ lacks clarity and precision. Sinoe this 
particular point is going to undergo considerablo development in 
the De Veritate, it soems best to postpone further conSideration 
- ...;...;...;;;...;;..:-..-
of it until the next chapter. 
Now that the nature and causes of pleasure have been treated, 
some attention must be g1ven to the necessary cond1tions of pleas-
ure. They are two in number and have already been ment1oned. 
First, the operation which is the formal and efficient cause must 
be an unlimpeded operation. This means that it must be free from 
internal and external hindrances and acoording to nature or it ntay 
not afford ploasu:r>e at all. 
The second oondi tion 1s Imowledge. In a very basic sense 
knowledge is l""equired i'OI' pleasure, for only a beine endowed with 
the power of COGnition can expel"ience pleasure. This is almost 
obvious, for only oognitive beings have appetite and pleasure 
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belonGs to appetite. 3? YUlowledge is also required rrom W10ther 
point of view, as an exa.mplo will show. A man may have a lal"ge 
Sl.l!!l of money in his pocket.. This is surely a good really in his 
possession, but if he does not know he has the money it will give 
~im no pleasure at all. This is true of any ~onum oonvenie~ ~­
-iLll1ctllIl?-i it must be known as really possessed before it Will be 
e. source of pleasure. St. Thomas expresses it this way. n[Clum 
leleotatio sit in appetitu, et omnis passio vel operatio appetitus 
praeexigat apprehensionern; oportet quod bonum conjunotum quod de-
~ectationem causat, sit apprehensum. n38 
Little notice is given to the effects of pleasure in the CO~ 
- -
1!entary ~ the Sentonces. They are m.entioned only in passing and 
are not elaborated. Some of them have been notod already. First, 
::>leasure consists in the termination of the movoment of." the appe-
~ite, so that the quieting of the appetite may be considered an ef-
~ect of pleasure. Seoond, operations and activities that are 
~leasant are performed more diligently and attentively.39 Thlrd, 
?leasure completes and pe~fects an unimpeded operation prooeeding 
~rom a habit oOnf"ormable to nature.4o Fourth, bodily pleasures 
nay impede the use of reason beoause of the bodily changes in-
3?!!! I ~., 1, 4, sol. 1. .!,!!IV ~., 49, 3, 2, sol. 
38El IV Sent •• 49, 3, 1, sol. 1. 
39Ibld" , 
-
a. 3, sol. 3 ad 3. 




With the presentation of tho nature, causes, conditions and 
effects of pleasure as given in the C,om.~entar;z: .£!3 the S.ent,ences, 
the work of Chapter III is finished. neoause of tho length and 
complexity of this chapter a summary will be helpful. 
By nature, pleasure is the termination of appetitive move-
ment. Therefore it is not a passion in the ordinary sense, but be-
cause of its intimate connection wi til appeti tivo rilOVEhilont and con-
sequent bodily ohanges it is assigned to the oategory of nassio. 
From anothor point of view, pleasure is a secondary perfection 
like health which perfects and oompletes natural and unimpeded 
operations. 
Natural, unimpeded operations proceeding from habits are the 
formal oaus~ of pleasure since they are its proper object and spec-
ify the pleasure to be of one kind rathor than another. The opera .. 
tions themBelves are speoified by a suitable good (bgnwn ~onveni­
,2£!), so the suitable good might be called the remote formal cause 
of pleasure. The efficient cause of pleasure is these same unim-
peded operations, but oonsidered now as the means through which a 
being comes into contact with w1d possesses suitable goods, and 
upon which pleasure follows as a natural complement and seoondary 
perfection. Under this aspeot the suitable good oan be oa.lled the 
remote effioient cause. Or t taldnc the two efficient causes to-
4llg IV ~., 49, 3, 5, sol. 1 ad 4. 
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cether, the good object could be called the causa.. guaa and the 
of)eration the ca~~ qua. Since it is already in the order of fi-
nality, pleasure does not nood a final cause, but tho suitable bood 
may be looked upon as the final cause, for it moves a being to 
place those opel~ation::J which will put it in possession of the Good 
and quiet the appetites. It is Interestinp' to note that the suit .. t:" 
able good is at once the final, !"cmote formal, and remote efficient 
cause of pleasure. 
Knowledge was seen to be a necessary £sndition for pleasure i 
two ways. First, a good !llust be known before it can arouse the 
appetl tes; second, after a Cood has CO:i18 into the possession of a 
being the fact of possession must be known befol"'e pleasure will be 
experienced. Of course, either of these acts of cognition can be 
the operation which is both the formal and efficient cause of 
pleasure. 
Two distinctions between pleasure and joy were conSidered, but 
no definite conclusion could be reached. Finally, two conditions 
and four effects of pleasure were montioned. Now it is time to 
turn to the 12!! Voritato, the second of the foul" primary sources. 
CllAPT.BR IV 
PLEASURE Dr THE DE y:ER:t~A TE 
Pleasure is treated :Ln the .!2.! Veritate in question 26, enti-
tled "The Passions of the Soul" Of the ten articles in this ques-
tion, the fourth and the fifth treat pleasure more specifically. 
The fourth article asks, "On What Grounds A'J.'o the Contrariety and 
~iversity among the Passions of the Soul Based?" and the fifth 
asks, "Are Hope, Fear, Joy, and Sadness the POUl" Principal Passions 
of the Soul?"l In read1n3 over these two articles one is lead to 
ask, "Why 1s joy so frequently mentioned and numbored among the 
~assions, while pleasure receives con~)aratively little notice?" 
The answer to this question goos back to the difficult dis-
tinction between pleasure and joy in Book III of tho Sentences 
Iwhich was discussed in the last chapter. In that distinction, it 
will be remembered that ploasure was compared to pain and joy to 
sorrow, and pleasure and joy were said to be distinct in the same 
1Thomas Aquinas, Truth, III, trans. Robert "VV. Schmidt, S.J., 
(Chicago, 1954), pp. 261 and 267. This work will hereaftor be re-
ferred to as Truth with the appropriate question and article num-
bers followinc_ 'This translation has bean chosen in preference to 
older Latin editions ot the De Ver1tate because it was made trom 
the detinitive Leonine text. -The writer has constantly referl"·ed 




way that pain and sorrow are distinct. This was seen to mean that 
pleasure is a bodily passion, belongs to apprehensive powers (the 
five exterior senses), not to appetite, and is oompleted in appre-
hension. Joy, on the other hand, was said to be a psychical pas-
sion, is in the apnetites as its subject, and begins with apprehon-
sian and tel~rninates in the operation of tho appetites. Almost 
identical doctl"ine is contained in the section of tho ~ Vori tate 
now undor considoration, as the following two passages will make 
clear. The first passage reads as follows. "In its strict sense 
pain should not be numbered among tho passions of the soul, because 
it involves nothing on the part of the soul beyond mere apprehen-
sion; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but the injury itself 
is in the body. !i'or this reason even AugustIne adds in the same 
place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than 
lPain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself. n2 
It is to be noted that pain is not a passion because it involves 
~othing beyond apprehension, but sadness is completed in the appe-
ti ti 'Ie power i teelf • 'rhomas goe s on to say in the vOr"J next para-
graph: 
Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and 
pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body 
union with something a[irooablo, and on the part of the soul 
the feeling of this agreeableness. Similarly spiritual 
pleasure involves a certain real uIlion of two. things that 
agree with each other, and the perception of this union. 
Thus in defininc~ sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is 
Zrruth, 26, 4, ad 4. See also q. 26, ), ad 9. 
a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defin-
ing pleasure in ceneral, said that pleasure is the unhampered 
operation of a habit conformable to nature. For an agreeable 
o?el:'at1on 1s that un! ted agreeable thing which causos pleas-
ul'e, espeCially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasupo of either 
kind begins with real union and is completed in its apprehen-
sion. Joy, however, bogins with apprehension and ends in the 
affections. 3 
The key words here of course are: "Thus pleasure of either kind be-
gins wttth a real union and is completed in its apprehonsion. Joy, 
~owever, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections." 
Since pleasUJ:'e is completed in apprehension, it cannot be a passion 
for in the next article Thomas says clearly that the passions are 
in the sense appetitive part of the soul and mentions joy as one of 
tho four pI'\incipal passions.4 Small wonder that pleasure gets 
li ttle notice in this tl"eatment of tho passions of the soul, then, 
IWhile joy 1s prominently mentioned. 
It will be remembered that Thomas hesitated to call pleasure a 
passion in the strict sonse in the Com.mentar;z .2!! 2. Sen~ence~, but 
for a much different reason. In the Sentences pleasure is said to 
consist in the termination of appetitive move~l1ent, and thus to lack 
tho essential note of motion. But hore in the De Voritate Dleas-
- ........ 
ure is not called a passion bocause it does not; belong to the appe-
titive part of the soul at all, but to the a.pprehensivo. This doc-
trine wa.s clearly foreshadowed in the distinction between joy and 
pleasure found in Book III of the Sente.l1oes and outlined above. 
3Truth, 26, h, ad 5. 
db ...... 
4 Ib1d., a. 5, pri~. See also q. 26, 3, ad 11. 
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In the previous chapter tho wrlter attempted to solve the diffi-
culty by appealing to the natul"al tendency or "natural apDotlte" 
that each faculty has to place its own particular operat:ton. When 
an unhampored onoration occurs, pleasure completes and porfects 
that operation. Therefore, the five extern.al senses mif'ht be 
looked upon as the source or pleasure when they perform unhampered 
operations, and this may be what Thor:las means when he says that 
sense pleasure is completed in apprehension. Joan Lanclois, S.J., 
takes a vory similar a'01'roaoh in his attempt to put senso pleasure 
back into the appetites. 
Le bien et Ie mal sont objet de l'appetit. La presence 
du bien engendre le plaisir, celle du mal, .la douleur. Quand 
u~ sens per90it un objet qui lui est proportionn6, et qui, 
des lors, constltuo un bien pour lui et pour tout l'individu, 
il se produit une react~on dans l'appetit: o'est le plaisir. 
Da.'1S un sons tout a fait equlvoqu.o, de meme que It on 
narle d'amour "naturel," l'on pourralt parler de delectation 
"naturelle" pour desi£nor l'etat de 1a faculte COGnitive lors 
qu'elle a per9u un objet proportionne ••••. La sensation est 
dans la raculte de coru1alsanoe,~mais.le plaisir au la dou-
leur sont dans.l'appetit. Voila pourquoi Joan de Salnt-
Thor:ms apports cette .p:r-oclsion: "[Sensus oxternus] tristatur 
vel delectatur de sua cQgnit:tone non formaliter, Id enlm per-
tlnot ad ap1:)etitum, sed objective, quia. de tali cO,gnitione ut 
de objecto ~ppetitusr:'laetatur." (£ura. Phil., T. III, ad. 
Reiser, p. 248 b 25)~ 
st .. Thomas seems to leave himself open to this interpretation when 
he says, "Sensible ploasure involves on the part of tho body union 
wi th something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling 
5Jean LangloiS, 8.J., "La definition de 1a delectation," 
~aval Theologique at Philosophique, V, (191+9), 181+. 
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Iof this agreeableness. tt6 
The writer made another attempt to explain how sense pleasure 
!Could belong to the sense appetites by saying that sense pleasure 
arises in tho appetite when the operation of one or more of the 
oxterior senses is the formal cause or pleasure. Thomas's doc-
trine here in the Q! Veritate seems to admit of this interpreta-
tion; for he says, "Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real 
union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins 
with apprehension and ends in the affections." His oonolusion from 
this in the very next sontenoe is: "Thus pleasure is sometimes the 
~ause of joy, just as pain is sometimes tho cause of sadnoss.n7 
~ way is here opened for getting pleasure back into the appetite; 
ror if pleasure oauses joy, then the act of apprehension in which 
pleasure consists is the cause of movement in the appetite. Thomas 
~ays ear11er in this same passage: "For an agreeable operation 1s 
~hat united af~oeable thing which oauses pleasure, especially spir-
~tual pleasure." The agreeable operation in this ca.se would be the 
~ct of apprehension. It will be remembered that Thomas also said 
~n the Sentenoes that ag:r.·eeable opcl"'atlons are, under different 
~spects, both the formal and effioient causes of pleasure. 8 
6Truth, 26, 4, ad 5. The passace is quoted in full on f,p. 53-54. Tue Latin version of the rtfeelin.~ of this agroeablenoss' is 
sensus illius convenlentiae. 
7Ibid. 
BChapter III, pp. 35-38. 
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The notion of spiritual pleasure in the passage just dealt 
with clears up an obscurity noted in the previous chapter. 9 There 
a certain unnamed kind of pleasul"e, belonging to the apprehensive 
powers other than tho five exterior senses, was mentioned. Com-
parison indicates that the deleotatio spiritualis here mentioned 
und the unnar.1ed pleasure of the Sentences. are one and the same .. 
[Iho reason is that both are psychical passions, not bodily pas-
sions, and are so,~lehow involved in the opol"ations of tl1e apprehen-
sive powors other than the five exterior senses. 
'rurninr, now to the body of ar·ticlo 4 of ques·tion 26, we find 
a threefold distinction in the passions of the soul_ The second 
pf the three distinctions is that by which the passions a1"e dis-
tinguished in species within the sarne power. Two different bases 
~re given for the distinction: fil"st, according to contrariety of 
pbjocts; second, "aocording as the conoupiscible power is referred 
in different ways to tho same object, or in other words aocording 
:to the different stages that can be considel'ed in the course of an 
anpetitive movement. 1f The plaoe assigned to eaudium Is of partio-
~lar interest. 
For the pleasurable object Is first united psyollically with 
the l~an who se€)l~s it, by beine: approhended as like him or a-
greeable to him. From this th.ere follows the passion of love, 
which is nothing but the speCifIcation of the appetite by the 
form of the appetlble object. • • • But what has thus been 
united psychically is sought further with a view to its being 
united really, so that the lovel~ enjoys tho possession of the 
beloved. Thus is born the paSSion of desire, Which, when the 
9See Chapter III, pp. 47-48. 
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objeot has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first 
staGe, then, in the movement of the conoupisoible power is 
lovo; the seoond, desi.re; and the last, joy.l0 
It is to be noted that joy arise~ when the object has been obtained 
in reality, that is, when I'eal union has been established and the 
arpeti to quieted. 11 In the Conrnentary' 2E: ~ § .. ontencos this last 
stare in the appetl ti ve movc:-nont was called deleotatio, pleasure. 12 
It is almost as though Thomas has substituted joy for pleasure in 
ithe De Veritate. This m.ight \ye11 be "'hat happened, for Thomas 
lolds in the Q!! y"eritate that pleasure is not a passion or a move-
nent of the appetite, as has been seen. Joy seems to be the only 
other term that could have been used. 
In support of this contention the body of the fifth artiole 
oan be oited. 
Now joy and sadness come from the attainL~ont o£ cood or evil, 
a.nd that essentially; £or joy comes from a Good inasmuch as 
it is good, ruld sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is 
evil. And all the other passions of the concupiscible power 
likewise come from Good 01" evil essentially. • • • Yet'the 
other passions of the concupiscible po\ver presuppose joy and 
sadness as their cause; for a good beco~es loved and desi~ed 
by the concupiscible by x'eason of its boine apprehended as 
pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by be-
lOTruth, 26, L~ c. 
llAt first Glanco there might seem to be a contradiction here, 
for in Truth, 2,f), L~ ad 5 Tho;;1as says thut ~loasul"e be::::ins with 
rea,l unIon while .J..2;i begins with app:pohons~on. But thore does not 
soem to be any reason why tho very appreh.ension w:1ich terr::dnates 
pleasure cannot be tho sar,lO ono wlth which joy berins. In this ex-
planation, joy would still be the last stage in appetitive move-
ment, though pleasure would be prior- by nature. On thi s point soe 
the passaZe fl-'om the Sontences quoted on p. }~3 of t~lis thesis. 
121!! IV ~ .. , 49, 3. 1, sol. 1. See p. 30 of this thesis. 
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ing approhended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetonoy 
joy and sadness are pl"lol"', thou£:,;h in the o:;. .. der~ of execution 
and attainment they are posterior. 13 . 
Joy, then, is first in tho order of appetency, but last in the 01"-
aer of oxeoution and attain::lont; or, in tho languaGo of artiole 4., 
it is "the last stage in the movement of tho concupiscible power." 
A01"oover, it enjoys a positIon of natural priority, fOl" the other 
)assion3 of the concupisoiblo power which have e;ood as their objeot 
presuppose joy as their cause. 
A position opposed to this was held in tho Sentences, as the 
... 
('0110w1n8 quotation vlill show. "Pleasure and joy have the same 
oause, but not in the same order; for first and essentially it is 
the oause of pleasure; secondarily it is the cause of joy. For 
something that has been apPl"ehended nevor causes joy except as it 
is krlOwn to be really unitod or unitable in itself to cause pleas-
urej and thorefore the attaining of a perfeotion first and essen-
tinIly causes pleasure; but in so far as it is apprehended as oaus-
~nt: pleasure, it causes joy even when it is not actually causing 
pleasure; therefore ploasure is naturally prior to joy."14 Hote 
~hat in this quotation pleasure is first in the order of appetenoy" 
~oy is relegated to a secondary position and is not one of the four 
tprincipal passion.s as it is in the ~ Veritat~. Although it is not 
!explioitly stated that pleasure is last in the ordel' of exeoution 
13Truth, 26, 5 o. 
14m rv ~., 14-9. 3, 1, sol. 4 ad 2. The Latin version of ~his passage will be found on p. 43 of this thesis. 
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and attainxnent, this ha.s beon noted in nutnerous pass8.f;es from tho 
S,entences already considoxeod.15 The point to be notod is that in 
the ~ Vel"itate joy sooms to have the place occupiod by ploasure in 
the Son;tenc,es. 
Two coclparativoly minor points remain to be considered in the 
~ Verltate.. The first concerns the notion of "pre-delectation" 
mentioned in tho previous chapter. l6 Thomas touchos on this point 
in the ~ Ve.rita~~ when he says that the movement of tho concupis-
cible and irascible powers can be considEn~od in two respects, 
namely, in desiring and in executinc.. In deslring, "tho concupis-
cible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the 
pleasurablo object.,,17 now "moved to enjoyment" seems to indicate 
that theI'e is a kind of ttprelirll1nary pleasure If in the appoti to even 
before the actual possession of the good object. :Jore definite 
information on this point will be found in -tho chaptel" on the ~urnlna 
Theolo£:io.e. 
The last point oonoerns pleasure of the intellect and is found 
in the reply to an objection.1B The burden of the objeotion is 
that passions in the strict sense, vii th their essential note of 
contrariety, are in the intellect. Thomas solvos the difficulty 
l5,!a IV ~., It9, 3, 1, sol. 1. 1!! III ~., 27 J I, 2, ad 3 
16Chaptor III, p. 34. 
17~ruth, 25, 6, ad 3. "Sed concupisoibilis, ad solB.b'l appre-
hensionem deloctabilis, movetur ad f:-uitionem dolectabllis." 
18Ibid., 3, ad 6. 
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pJ'" distinguishing between tho act of lJnderstanding and the thing 
lUderstood. Intellectual pleasure is caused by the union of the 
ntelloet and a suItable intelli?;ible object through an intolligi-
)le species; that is, by an act of undcrstandinr:. But nothing is 
)ontra1""'J to an intolli:.:::ible speoies, rOJ' even the species of con-
L.ral"'ies are not contrf:u'Y in the soul. The!:'efore, from the view-
)oint of tilO act of undo:;:>sturldlng, t.horo can be no contl'·ary passion 
n tho intellect and plea::mre will necessarily follow. 19 
But broadly speakinr;, sadno3s or pain can be said to be in the 
ntolloct when tho intclleot undc:;:tstands something as harIni'ul, to 
"hich the will is avorao.. t'Bocause that har!:1ful thine, howeveI', is 
lot harmful to the intellect as undc!l:~standinv it, sadness or pain 
~s not contrarUyopposed to the delight of the intellect, which 
~o:'1es from understandinc something sui table to the intellect in 80 
F-ar a.s it undcl:>stands. n20 
In this reply there is nontioned a third kind of pleas1.U'O, 
~electatio intellectua.lis, which follows upon the act of under-
~tanding considered as an unhampered operation. Obviou:Jly, Thomas 
~ooks upon intelleotual pleasure as a croVininG secondary perfection 
pf the intellect, the act of undol"st:1nding beine the pl"'imary pel"'-
f;>ection. 
With this tho oonsideration of pleasure in the De Veritate is 
19Por almost identical doctrine see 1.£ IV ~., 49, 3, 3, 
sol. 2. 
20Truth, 26, 3, ad 6. 
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finished. Pleasure in the COfllf'1entary on the IUoornaoh~a.Q Ethios 
ill be tho subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
PLEASURE IN THE C OM!1!EN~AIiX ON !!!! ETHIC S 
Sinoe this ohapter will study St. Thomas t s doctT'ine on pleas-
ure in one of his Al"istotolian cOr:1.:'aentaries, it will be well to 
preface a fow remari{s about his intention and method in these com-
mentaries. 
v1here intention is concerned, it soe;:15 clear that Thomas meant 
primal~ily to expound the work of Aristotle.. If one consults any of 
the com.nentaries, he finds a careful, even a painstaking division, 
analysis, and exposition of the Aristotelian text. Secondary sour-
cos call attention to an important point of extrinsic evidence, 
Inamely, contemporary history.l At the tirno Thomas wroto most of 
his Aristotelian commentaries, Aristotlets works were suspect and 
under hoavy fire from Christian theolol:ians and scholars at Paris 
and oven from the Pope. Introduced to the WOl"ks of Aristotle by 
St. Albert, who was the first great Christian cOr:l:r!ontator on the 
Stagyrite, Tho:uas recognized how valuable Aristotle could be in 
building a truly Christian philosophy. He wanted to pr'eservo Aris-
lThonas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros MetaPh~siCOrUrl1 Aristotelis 
Exposltl0, ad. Haj'lllondSplazzl, 6.p., [TurIn, 1 50), xvi-xvIII. . 
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totlo from false interpretation, especially the Averroistic, and 
from consequent papal conderri1lation. To do this he chose the sound-
est and l.'lost Insting way. wri tini:~ cru"oful and accurate corn.;ilentariea 
to expound Aristotle's work COl"rectly. Thus fI'ora both internal and 
external evidence, it seems ClCD.l" that St. Thor:tas l s intention is to 
expound the text of Aristotle carefully and correctly. 
ii. few words will suffice on St. Thomas's method in these oom-
mentaries. They are all literal expositions of Latin translations 
of Aristotle. Speaking of the comrnentary on the ~ Anl~a, Ivo 
Thomas says: "It cannot be too clearly emphasized that the Comm.en-
tary is only what it calls itself, an exposition of a text. It is 
that even before being an exposition of what is said in the text; 
that perhaps more than an exhaustive assertion of what in detail 
the com.:'1lcntator held to be the truth."2 
St. Thomas's standard procedure is something like this. Each 
loctio or main division he[,1ns by showing the place within the 
whole work of tho passaGo under lrnnodiato consideration. The pas-
sage is then logIcally dividod and subdivided down to s;:aall phl'ases 
Only aftor this formal analysis of the text has been. made does St. 
Tho!ilaS go on to oxplain the material contained in it. Thus it is 
clear that his method is in full accord with his intention to ex-
2Aristotle t s De Anir.la in the Vel~sion of William of Moorbeke 
and the COtllr:lGntaryof 'St; Thomi."SAquillas, trans. Kenelrii Foster;-
o.P.--arid Silvester Hurnpnl~iea, b.p. (London, 1951), Introd., pp. 13-
14. 
.ound clearly and aoourately the text of Aristotle. 
When this has been said, the question naturally arises, "Can 
these commentaries be looked upon as sources of 'rhomistic Joctl"lno, 
or does St. Thomas confine himself strictly to expound.inG Aristo-
tle?" The Aristotelian corrunentaries are far from beinG the richest 
sourcos of' Thomistic doctrine, but neither are they oompletely bar-
'''en. They must be read carefully to asoertain when Thomas is ex-
ounding Aristotle, when he is explaininG or quoting Aristotle with 
approval. and when he is giving his own doctrine. In preparing 
"his fifth ohapter, the writer has tried oarefully to distinguish 
etwoon these throe levels and to present what seems to be Thomas's 
wn doctrine. 
A final preliminary consideration is this. The present chap-
er doa1s with St. Thomas f s comL1Emtury on the N'iool:lacllean I\thios. 
t onco, therefore, we are in an ethioal context. It is well to 
~eep this in mind, for even when he speaks of the natm."'e of pleas-
re Thomas's basic viewpoint will not be metaphysical or psycholog-
cal, but ethical. 
In tho Nicomaohean Ethics pleasure oomos in fo::. ... discussion in 
several places, as follows: in Book I, where the questions relating 
o happiness are raised; in Book II, ohapter' ), \,hEH'e the nature 
f good acts and virtue is under exunlna.tion; in Book III, chapter 
9, in connection with the virtue of temperance; in Dook VII, chap-
ers 11 to 14, where continenoe and inoontinence are treated; and 
in Book X, chapters 1 to 8, whel"O tho natm."'e of pleasuro and its 
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relationship to happiness are discussed. The most extended and 
impo~tant passages are in Book VII and Book X, which will be ana-
lyzed here, but with regard for the other seotions. 
In the very beginning of Book X St .. Thomas gives us one of 
those very helpful guideposts which looks both forward and back-
ward. It reads as tollows. 
Et dicit quod post praedlcta consequens est, ut pertrans-
eunter, idest breviter, de delectationo tractetur. Tractavo-
rat quidem supra in septimo de deleotatione, inquantwn est 
rnateriae continentiae. Unde ibi potissime sua consideratio 
versabatur oiroa deleotationes sensibiles at oorporales. Nuno 
autem intendi t detcn'>cllinare de deleotatione seclL'1dur!1 quod ad-
jungitur tellcltati. Et ideo praeQlpue determinat de deloota-
tione intelligibili et splrituali • .5 
With tho way thus pointed out, we turn to Book VII, Where censide-
ration is given ohiefly to sonse pleasure. 
It will be remembered from the first chapter that Plato held 
that all pleasures involvo cenGl"'ation or becoming, and therefore 
are nei thol" e:ood nor fully peal. To answer Plato, Aristotle m.alws 
an important distinction that St. Thom.as explains a.nd approves.4 
!Iot all pleasures, he says, are generations or involve genel'ations. 
Those that do involve generation ax'e the aots which are oonstitu-
tive of habits, but there are also pleasurable oporations. 
Operations are more perfect than the habits from Which they 
proceed. Habits must be acquired by repeated aots and, onoe formeq 
3Thomas AqUinas, In DeoGr:1 IJiln'os 't.i!thlcoI'UIn Aristotelis ad 
Hioomachum Expos.i,tio, acr. it. 'lif. Plrotta, O.P. TTurin, !949),-X, 1, 
n. 1954. 
4!g VII ~., 12, nne 1483-93. 
eive rise to operations. For this reason habits are called first 
perfections, while the operations proceeding fl"Orll them are called 
second perfections. It is true that the acts which form a habit 
nay be pleasul"able, but tilis is only a.ccidental. These acts oon-
stitutive of habits a.rc the generations of which Plato spoke, but 
even they participate in good because they are ordered to the for-
nation of first perfections or habits. To sum up in the words of 
st. Thomas: "Sic ergo vera et pOl' sa deleotationes sunt i11ae quae 
aunt circa oporationes pr'ocedontos ox habl tibus, seu naturis at 
!t:ormis jam oxistentibus. Il1ae autem delectationes quae Bunt con-
stitutivae habituum et nat1.u"arum, non sunt vcrc et siIupliciter do-
lectationes, sod pOI' accidcns."5 
Aristotle goes on to forlilulate a definition of pleasul'e to re-
r,p1ace Plato's faulty definition, which r'cads: tfDelectatio ost qua.e-
dam sensibilis goneratio in naturam. n6 Plato's de.finition will fit 
only those accidentally pleasurable acts which a.re constitutive of 
li:labits. A definiti9n must be formulated which will include true 
~leasures, those which a1'>iso from operations proceeding from habits. 
Tho definition finally formulated and its explanation is as follows. 
Delectatio eat operatio non imEedi ta habi tus qu~, est secundum 
n'aturam, Ideat' ru:t: -naturae habontis cona:rult. Impedimentum' 
autonl oporation s c.llff'icultatom causat fn operando, quae de-
loctationom exolud1t. Ideo aut em quibusdam visum est quod de-
lectatl0 sit generatio quaedam, quia delectatl0 cst cil"ca 1d 
quod est principallter bonum, idest oirca operatlonem quam ex-
r.: 
':}In VII ~., 12, n. lLl-8B. 
6~., 11, n. 1474. 
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istlmant esse idem. generationi, cum tamen non sit ielonl, sed 
aliquid postorius.. Nam c;oneratio est via in natJ,l.ram. Opera-
tio autem est usus naturalls tormae aut habitus.' . 
This definition olearly puts pleasure in the order of finality be-
cause true pleasures have to do only with unhindered operations, 
which are seoondary perfeotions proceeding from habits. But one 
important question must be asked about the definition. Is pleasure 
the unhindered operation itself, or is it caused by the operation? 
The following passage, taken from tho next lesson, thl~OWS some 
light on tho point. 
[U]niuscujusque habitus aunt oporationes aliqua.o non impodi-
tae. Felicitas autem est operatio non impodita vel omnilun 
bonorum. habituum, vel alic,jus eorum, • •• [,~juia operatio 
non impodit.a est felleitas, at hoc etiam delectationem ca.usat, 
inde est quod omnes existimant vitam folicem esse delectabilem 
Et rationabl11ter adjungunt) delectatlonera fellcltati. Quia 
nulla operatio perfecta. cst 1m.ped.ita. Felicitas autern est 
perfectum bonum. • • ~ Unde est operatio non impedita, quia 
delectationem causat.o 
What 3eom3 to be said here is that unhindeI'ed 0pol'ations give rise 
to happiness (fellcitas),9 and happiness in turn oauses pleasure. 
But full clarification of this point will have to wait until Book X 
is taken up. 
Before turning to Book X, one important passage concerning the 
cause of pleasure should be oonsidered. This passaGe occurs in 
Book III, lesson 19, where Aristotle deals with tempera..'1ce. The 
7Ibid., 12, n. 11t93. 
8~bi.?-., 13, nn. 1505-06. 
9In I Eth., 10, n. 130, felic! tas is defined as opol"atio 121"'0-
pria hOmtnissecundU!l! v.1rtutem 1a ~ Eerfoct.~. 
passage is lone;, but it merits full quotation. 
Distinguit deleotatlones. Et dicit quod oar~~quaedam 
aunt animales, quaedam corporales. Corporalos quidem. delec-
tationes aunt, quae consummantur in quadam corporali passione 
exterioris sensus. Anlmales autem delectationes aunt quae 
consummantur ex sola apprehensione interiori. Et exempliflcat 
de delectationibus anirnalibus, incipions a causa de1ectationis 
quae est ar:or. Unusquisque cnlm dolectatur ex hoc quod habet 
ill quod amat. InvenituI' autem in quibusda.rn amor honoris, et 
in quihusdam arnor disciplinae, quae non apprehenduntur exterl-
ol~i sensu, sed intoriori aporebonsione a.nlmae. Unde uterque 
sorum, scilicet et illo qui est amator honoriS, at ille qui 
est al11a.tor Jisciplinae, gaudet per id quod amat, dura scilicet 
habet ipsum.. Et hoc gaudium non fit per allglJ,em corporis paa-
aionem, sed por sola.m apprehensioncll1 mentis. IV 
In this passaC~e we find first a distinction between bodily and psy-
chical pleasures. The basis of tho distinction is tIle way in which 
the two types of pleasure arIse, bodily pleasures by movement of 
the exterior senses, psychical pleasures by interior apprehension 
alone. V/hat is lil0ant by interior approhension is shown by two ex-
amples in which abstr'act things like honor and order are desired. 
rrhe cause of pleasure is desire, for a man is pleased because he 
gets possession of what he desires. now some lUon de:Jire honor, and 
they l~ejolce when they attain it. This joy does Ylot arise from a 
podily change, but fl~om the mind's u..'1derstanding that honor has 
boen won. 
It should be noted that desire is said to be a cause of pleas-
ure, and that pleasure &.:I:'ises when the desired good is actually 
possessed, presumably thl--ollgh suitable unimpeded activity on the 
physical or sonse level. But joy (saudium) doos not arise from 
lOla III ~., 19, n. 600. 
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[bodily change, but from mental apprehension. St. Thomas seems to 
present here a third doctrine of the difference betweon pleasure 
and joy. He soems to indicate that suitable unimpeded activity on 
the physical or sonse level gives rise to pleasure, and that like 
activity on the rational level gives l~ise to joy. Clarification 
and confirmation of this ,?oint will be noted in the next chapter. 
Now our attention must be turned to Book X, where St. Thomas 
Ibocins by saying, tlN"unc autem IntencU t detorminare de delectatione 
secundum quod adjunc:1 tur follcl tat1. Et ideo pl'>aecipue determlnat 
de doloctationo intelligibili €It spirituali.«ll 
In tho very beginning of Book X the following interestinG 
statement occurs. ttpraocipue enim consistit virtus moral is. in or-
dinatione appetitus, quae cognoscitur pOI" ordlnationeln deleotatlo-
nis at trlstitiao, quae consequuntur omnes appetitivae partis mo-
tus, ut supra in sec undo dictum. est. ,,12 Pleas.ure and sadness, theq 
follow all movements of the appetitive part of the soul. The re-
:Cex'ence ms"de to Book II is worth investigation, for it clarifies 
tho quotation just civen. ' 
Et ideo enumerando pa3sione9, dicit quod passlones aunt 
conoupiscentia, quam nominarnus desideriu,'11, et ira, et timor, 
at audacia, et invidia quae contlnetur sub tl"'>istitia, at 
gaudium quod continetur sub delectatione, est 8nim dalectatio 
non corporalia, Dod intoriori apprehensione cOllsistens: €It 
a.m.icitla, €It odium., et desiderium.. Quod differt a concupis-
centia: 00 quod concupi9centia ent delectationis corpol"alis, 
desiderlum 8utem cujusllbet altoI'ius delectabilis ..... 
Addit autam quod universalitcr ad or:mia praedicta sequi-
Ill.!! X _th., 1, n. 1954. 
12Th., d n 1 qc6 
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tur delectatio et trlstitia; quia omnia. alia importa.nt motus 
quosda'll in bonum et nal Url, ex quoru.m su.pcrventu causa tur do-
lectatio vel tristitia. Undo omuss aliae passionos terminan-
tur ad dolectatlonom ot t;pistitiam. 13 
Tho chief point to be noted Is that ploasu:;:>e and sadness follow 
upon all the passions hor'o .,:,lEmtioned. Tho roason is that all these 
passions involve movement of the appetites in regard to good and 
evil, and the attalnrnent of the good desb'cd or evil feared is the 
cause of pleasul"e and sadness. Therefol""e all the passions are 
t~rminated in oi thor pleaStll"O or sadness. It sooms tilat pleasure 
and sadness are themselves passions, for Thomas says OI¥1ef!, ~liae 
:Q.asniones. 
Anothor point to be noted is that delectatlo is here ::lade the 
generic torm and ~audium. 1s one or its infel:"iol'·s. GaudiUtll is said 
to be non-bodily pleasure, conSisting in interior apprehenSion of 
soma good. Further, a distinction is made between ~oncuoiscentia 
and desl.derium. Concupiscence is the paSSion which preee:les bodily 
pleasure, while desire is the passion which pl"ocodes 8.11 other 
pleasures. 
The doctrine presented here 1s quite consistent with what has 
already been seen, especially in the SentenQ~. Knowledge of a 
good gives rise to appetitive movement toward that good. When the 
appetite finds rest in possession of the good, pleasure results. 
Another inSight into the nature of pleasure is civen in lesson 
3, where the Platonic dootrine is unJer discussion. n[D]eleotatio 
13In II Eth., 5, nn. 291l. 296. 
- -
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pst passio animas. Patet ergo, quod delectatl0 non est ipsa reple-
~io seu generatio. sed quoddam ad hoc consequens. Facta autem re-
pletione aliquis delectatur, sicut facta inoisione aliquis dolet et 
~ristatur.ttll.t Here again emphasis is plaoed on the notion that 
pleasure is not movement, but something: consequent upon movement. 
rhis notion w111 soon be developed .fully. 
In lesson 5 of Book X there is a long discussion proving that 
pleasure is neither motion nor generation. The viewpoint of this 
lesson is entirely negative and most of the material has already 
been seen. but one passage merits quotation. In this passage 
pleasure is compared to vision, the oporation of the sonse of 
si[pt. 
Sed visio statim in momento perficltur. Et idem est de delec-
tatione. Est enim deloctatio quoddam totum, ldost completum 
in primo instanti quo inoipit esse, ita quod non potest aoclpi 
a1iquod tempus in quo fiat delectatio, quod l"equirat arnplius 
tempus ad speclem deleotationls perficiondanl, siout oontinrit 
in his quorum Goneratl0 e;3t in tempol"'~h Potest enim accipl 
al1quod tempus generationis h~anae. quod requirlt ampllu8 ad 
speciam htunanam perfic iendam. 1;., 
This passage definitely recalls a parallel question in the Rommen-
tarz .2Q 1h£ Sentenoes where Thomas denied that pleasure was in 
time. Because it consists in the terraination of appetitive move-
ment, nloasUl"e Is instantaneous and therefore outside of timo. 16 
The next lesson, lesson 6. presents Aristotle's positive doo-
14In X Eth., 3, n. 1994. 
- -
1>Ibld., 5, nn. 2006-07. 
16In IV ~., 1t9. 3, 1, sol. 3, ad 3. 
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trine on pleasure. This is by far the fullest treatment of pleas-
ure in the Nioomaohean Ethics and the Thomistic COI!1flentary is a 
~lch source of Thomas1s own doctrine. 
Aristotle begins by snowing that pleasure Is the perfection 
~f an operation. Tho argument runs as follows. For an operation 
two things are needed, a faculty and an object of this faculty. 
~he better disposed the faculty is to eood operation and the more 
suitable the object is to the faculty, the more perfect will be the 
~esulting operation. Now experienoe testifies that the more per-
frect an operation is. the more pleasing it is, and that we experi-
$nce pleasure in the operations of all our senses and even of our 
intelloct. The conclusion is: "Si ergo operatio perfecta est de-
lecta.bilis. perfeotlssima autem deleetabilissima, consequens cst 
quod operatio, inquantum est perfecta, sit delectabilis, Deleeta-
tio ergo est operationis perfectio. nl7 
The next step is to show how pleasure perfects the operation. 
Pleasure has a role to play different from either the faculty or 
the object in perfocting the operation. Pleasure perfects the op-
oration Eel" modum forma~, and in this respect oan be compared to 
health. Health does not oause healing, but ratheJ:l oJ:lowns the suo-
cessful efforts of the dootor to heal a sick person. In the words 
of St. Thomas: 
Siout etirun ejus quod est sanari non eodem modo est oausa. 
sanitas at rnodicus; sed sanitas quideLl per modum formae, medi-
cus autem. per modum aeontis. Sirniliter 8.utem parricit opera-
14 
tionem per rnodunl quidcm forrnae deleotatio, quae est ipsa per-
factio ajus, per modum autei'll aGontis parrioit ipsam sensus 
bene dispoaitua siout movens motum. Senaibile autem conveni-
ens, sicut movons non motum. Et eadem. z.atio est cix'cEl. intel-
lactum. 1U 
For'tunately, further' information is provided about the meaning 
of per modum formae. After stating that pleasure perfects the op-
eration not efficiantly but formally, Thomas distinguishes two 
kinds of formal perfeotion. The first is intrinsio and oonstitutes 
the essence of a being. The second is extrinsic and perfeots a be-
ing already constituted in its species. Pleasure partakes of the 
latter; it is a certain crowning perfection which completes an op-
eration that has arisen from causes that arc well disposed. To 
quote st. Thomas: "(D]electatio perficit operationem non sicut hab~ 
tus qui inest, idest non sicut forma intrinseca esscntiae rei, sed 
sicut quldam finis, Idest quaedam perfectio superveniens, sicut pul 
chritudo venit juvenibus non quasi existens de essentia juventutls, 
sed quasi oonsequens bonam dispositionem causarum juventutis. Et 
similiter delectatio consequltur bonam dlsposltionem causarum oper-
ationis. tf19 
One last point deserves note. In discussing whether pleasure 
or the operation is desired fOI" itself, St .• Thomas lets fall a de-
finition of pleasure which seems to be entirely his own. "For 
pleasure is the repose of the appetite in the pleasing object, 
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which a man haa gained poasession of throUeft an operation. n20 
IAgain Thomas returns to conceiving pleasure as the repose of the 
~ppetite in an acquired good. This does not contradict his agree ... 
ing with Aristotle that pleasure Is the crowning peri'ectlon of an 
~impeded operation, but merely looks at pleasure from another 
~olnt of view. In fact, this definition contains two notions or 
views of pleasure that Thomas has been striving, whether conscious-
ly or unconsciously, to unite: the Christian Platonic "quietatio 
appetltus in bono" and the Aristotelian doctrine of unhindered op-
oration and its crowning porfection. These two notions are con-
tained in this one definition, but trley are still far from being 
ha.rmonized and united. That will have to wait until the mo:tts ma-
ture work of the Summa The,olo6iae. 
It will be remembered that earlier in this chapter the ques-
tion was :ttaised whethe:tt pleasure is an operation or is caused by 
an operation. 21 From what has been seen it is clear that pleasure 
is not an operation, but a formal porfection of an unimpeded oper-
ation. But it seems that pleasure mit!Jlt be identified with the 
operations of the senses and the intellect, since it is so often 
eon.1'1soted with the operations of those faculties. This possibility 
is ruled out because pleasure pertains to the appetitive part of 
the soul. In the words of St. Thomas: "Hec tamen est idem quod op-
20Ibid., n. 2038. "Nruu delectatio est quies appetitus in re 
delectante, qua quia per operationem potitur." 
21p. 68. 
pratio intellectus, neque idem quod operfltio sensus. HaM delecta-
~io ma.s1s ad appetitiva.m part em pertinet. Est autom inconvenlens 
s1 deleatatio aliquibus videatur esse idem operationi, propter hoc 
~uod ab opera.tions non separatur."22 In the la.st sentence the.fle 
~s the interesting obser'lration that pleasure is not separate trom 
~he operation it perfects, and for this reason some have identified 
Ithe two. Rather than an operation .. pleasure is a.n epiginomenon, 
~ "atter-e::f'feot," a formal perfection whioh oompletes and per1'ects 
Ithose operations which proceed from proper and well disposed oau-
~es. 
If pleasure is a formal perfection, it 1s also a perfection 
~n the order ot fina.lity, for it is a. good superadded to a being 
~hat is resting in possession 01' an acquired good. In the words 
pf st. Thomas, pleasure perfects an operation "siout quidem flnis, 
~dest quaedam pori'eotio superveniens."23 
With this the work of Chapter V 18 complete. An investigation 
pr the Summa Theologiae, the fourth and final primary source, will 
pe the work ot the next ohapter. 
22In X Eth., 8, n. 2054. 
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PLEASURE IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 
Although St. Thomas m~ntlons pleasure several times in the 
Summa Theologiae, two treatments of it stand pre-eminent. Both 
oocur in the Prima Secundae. They aro of major importanoe because 
of their length and completeness, and the faot that they treat 
1P1easure directly, not just in passing. 
The first is found in the treatise on the last end of man at 
the very beginning of the Prima Secundae. In the sixth article of 
the seoond question Thomas asks whether m.ants happiness oonsists 
in pleasure. In the first article of the eleventh question he 
treats of enjoyment or fruition, which is an act of th.e will. 
These passages, however, deal with ploasure in an ethioal oontext, 
and do not tal-ce up expressly the natUl~e and causes of pleasure. 
The second important treatment of pleasure in the Prima Seoun .. 
.9.!:! bears direotly on the work of this thesis. It is found in 
questions 31 to 34 and occurs in a treatment of the passions of 
the soul. After speaking of the passions in genera.l, St. Thomas 
takes up eaoh of the paSSions in partioular. The passions of the 
concupiscible part are dealt with first. Love, hatred, desire, 
pleasure and sadness are considered in that order. 
The tour questions on pleasure methodically consider the 
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natul~e 01: pleasure, its oauses, effeots, and goodness or evil. 
The dootrine is presented largely from a metaphysioal standpoint 
and with a firmness and olarity belonging to Thomas1s later works. 
In the first artiole of the question dealing with the nature 
of pleasure Thomas asks whether pleasure is a passion. The answer 
is in the at.firmative. The basio reason why pleasure is said to 
be a passion is that it is a movement of the sense appetite fol-
lowing upon sense apprehension. l This is somewhat surprising, 
sinoe Thomas has always spoken previously 01: pleasure as the ter-
-
mination of appetitive movement, and for this reason has hesitated 
to oa11 it' a passion in the striot sonse. The explanation of the 
change oan be found in the reply to the seoond objection, where 
two movements of the appetite are distinguished, one of desire for 
a good, the other of pleasure in this good once it has been ao-
quired. The prior movement of desire also oauses an exterior move-
ment toward possession in the order of exeoution. This passage 
must be quoted in full. 
Ad seoundum dioendum quod in animaii duplex motus 
oonsiderari potest: unus scOUndUi?l intentionem. finis, qui 
pertinet ad appetitum, alius secundum exeoutionem, qui 
pertinet ad exteriorom oporationem. Lieat ergo in eo 
qui ja~'!l oonseoutus est bonwn in quo dalectatur, oesset 
motus exeoutionis, quo tenditur in finem; non taman 
oessat motus appetitivae partia, quae, stout prIus de-
lRespondeo dicendum quod motus appatitus sensltlvl propria 
passio notninatur. • • • Aff'eotio autem quaecurnque ex apprehensione Ii 
sensitiva procedens, est motus appetltus sensitivi. Hoc autem ne- I 
cesse est oompetere deleotation!. • •• SIc ergo patet quod, cum ' 
deleotatI0 sit luotus in appotitu animali cOrlsequens apprehensionem 
sensus, deleotatio est passio animas. ~. 1., I-II, 31, 10. 
siderabat non habitum, ita postea deleotatur in habito. 
Lioet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, con-
siderata praesantia boni daleotantis, quod appetitul 
satisfaci t; tamen adhuc rem.anet i.mmutatio appetl tus ab 
appetihili, ratione oujus delectatio !notus quidam est. 2 
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~ere for the first time pleasure Is said to be a rcal movement of 
the appetite and therefore a passion in the strict sense. The 
reason Is that Thomas here reoognizes a movement of the appetite 
after it has gained possession of a desired good. It is true that 
the first appetitive movement of desire has ceased, and that the 
~xternal operation toward possession has come to an end, but the 
iappetite still oontinues to be moved to pleasure by the suitable 
~ood still present and now in its possession. 
More information about this newly mentioned movement of the 
~ppetite is certainly desirable, but St. Thomas does not provide 
~uoh. Only two instanoes oan be oited. The first oooursin a dis-
iOussion of one of the effects of pleasure called dilatatio. Admit-
~ing that this effect can be prodicated only metaphorioally of the 
~oul, Thomas asserts that it oan be applied to operations of both 
Ithe apprehensive and appetitive powers. In tho case of the appeti-
2Ibid., 31, 1 ad 2. Of interest and importance here also is 
itho commentary of Cajetan, who says thu.t pleasure f'ormally con-
Isists in the m.ovement of the appetite. "In primo articulo quaas-
it10nis trigosimaepr1rnae, eol11£6 requisita ad delectationem. Et 
~lde quinque exigi: subjectum, objectum, at tres actus; scilicet 
conjunctionis sorum, .. • • quam sicnlflcat ly constitutio; oogni-
tionis tam objecti quam conjunctionis, at hanc slsnItlcat ly sen-
sibilis; et imrllutationis appetitus, quae est formalis delectatl0, 
at hanc significat ly motus anim!. Objectum exigit connaturalita-
tem: quam significat 1y naturam existentem. Conjunctio vero 
~xigit slmultatem: quam sIgnn'icat ly ~ simul." 
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tive poweps, Thomas speaks desoriptive1y, as follows. "A1iud 
8.utem est ex parte appetit1vae virtutis, quae assentit rei deleo-
tab11i, et in aa quieseit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam inte-
rius capiendam.. Et sic dilatatur aff'eotus hominis per deleotatio-
nem, quasi se tradens ad continendunl interius rem dalectantem."3 
The movement of the appetite is here described as an enlargement, 
an attempt to reach out and take wi thin itself the good wi th which 
it is in contact. 
The seoond description of this movement of the appetite 00-
our's in di soussing whether pleasure oauses desire for i taolf.4 In 
the eourse of the disoussion Thomas mentions that a good ppcsent to 
a being may be possessed only imperfeotly by that being. This may 
Ibe due, i'lrst, to the nature of the good object. If it oan be pos-
sessed and enjoyed only gradually, like a seven course dinner, for 
instanoe, it will simultaneously arouse pleasure and desire. A man 
sitting down to such a dinner will be deli[hted by the appetiZer, 
but "dum • • • delectatur in eo quod habet, desiderat potiri eo 
quod restat." Thomas remarks that almost all bodily pleasuzoes 
cause desire for themselves in this way .. 
On the part of the being which is in contaot with a pleaSing 
object, this being may be incapable of enjoying that object all at 
once, even t~lour,h it is present and attainable. The pleasure 
aroused by partial or imperfect possession of the objeot stirs up 
3S.T., I-II, 33, 1 c. 
--
4Tbid 2 c 
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desire for perfect possession. 
Now it mi2::ht be argued that the desire for further enjoyment 
aroused by the first pleasurable oontaot with a suitable objeot is 
that immutatl0, appetitus whioh Thomas has made the formal oompon-
ent of pleasure. But a better explanation would seem to be this: 
the "rest in possession" is a vital thing, a kind of nervous ex-
oitement, one mlght say, not a passive state or a kind of inertia. 
It does involve desire for more, but that desire is not what the 
-
pleasure!.!. Rather, pleasure is the movement of an appetite in 
possession of a suitable good, the movement being oaused by the 
continued presence of the good.5 
Now that it has been definitely established that pleasure is 
a movement of the appetite, the question arises whether or not 
!pleasure is in time. Thomas's answer Is quite similar to the one 
he gave in the sentences, holding that pleasure is only aociden-
tally in tlme. The reason is that pleasure has as its objeot a 
good already possessed, and this is as it were the end of appeti-
tive movement. But if the aoquired good underGoes change, the 
pleasure in it will be accidentally in time, for tho pleasure will 
change in a way corresponding to the change in its object.6 
st. Thomas next olarifles a point that has been troublesome, 
SLicet enlm delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, conside-
rata presentia boni deleotantis, quod appetltui satisfacit; tamen 
adhuc remanet imm.utatio appetitus ab appetibill, ratione cujus de-
lectatio motus quidam est. Ibid., 31, 1, ad 2. See also 33, 2 ad 1. 




namely, the distinotion between pleasure and joy. He begins by 
saying that joy is a speoies of pleasure, but asserts that this 
term is used only to denote pleasure or the rational appetite. He 
further observes that, in the case of rational beings, whatever 
af"fords them pleasure may also afford them joy. However, he makes 
olear by repeated assertion that joy follows only upon intellectual 
apprehension of a suitable good. 7 The following passage oontains 
a good su~nary of the dootrine. 
[D]eleotatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis. 
Ad apprehenslonem autem rationis, non solum oornmovetur 
appetitus sensitlvus, per applicationem ad aliquid par-
ticularej sed etiwm appetitus intellectivus, qui dloitur 
voluntas. E't seoundum hoo, in appetitu intellectivo, sive 
in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudlum, non 
autem deleotatio oorpol'alis. 
Hoo autem interest inter deleotatlonem utriusque 
appet1tus, quod deleotat10 ~ppetitus sensibilis est cum 
aliqua trwlsmutatione corporali; delectatio auto. appe-
t1tus Intellectlvi n1hil aliud est quam simplex motus 
voluntatis. 8 
Before leaving the distinotion between pleasure and joy, it 
must be noted that joy is a passion only in the wide sense, for 
it does not involve any bodily movement or change.9 This is di-
rectly opposed to the notion of joy in the Q! Verltate, where it 
was held to be one of the four principal passions. However, joy 
was not there restricted to pleasure of the intellectual appetite. 
7Ib1d., 3 c and ad 1. See also q. 35, 2 c, where there is a 
olear explanation of the terms interior anprehensi.o and extel"ior 
a12prehensio. 
8~ •• 31, 4 0 prin. 
9Ibid., ad fin. and ad 2. 
-
The oause of pleasure is the next point disoussed by st. 
Thomas. The first article of question 32 discusses whether opera-
tion is the proper cause of pleasure. The body of the article 
reads as follows. "Respondeo dicendum quod • • • ad delectationem 
~uo requiruntur: scilioet consecutio boni convenientis, at cognitio 
~ujusmodi adeptionis. utr~mque autem horum in quadam operations 
consistit: nam actualis cognitl0 operatio quaedam est; similiter 
~onum conveniens adipiscimur aliqua oporatlono. Ipsa enim operatio 
propria est quoddam conveniens. Unde oportet quod omnis delectatio 
~liquam operationem consequatur. nlO 
It is to be noted that St. Thomas here specifies two opera":' 
tions that are required for pleasure. One of these operations must 
~nite a cognitive being with a good suitable for it, and the other 
ioperation must give the being knowledge that it is actually in pos-
session of this suitable good. In this passage Thomas mentions on-
p.y in passing a point he lnade much of in the commentarl 2!! the 
~entences. This is that the very oporation which unites a cognitive 
being with an objeot is itself a suitable good and therefore a 
cause of pleasure. In the Sentences it was even stated that the 
-
unimpeded operation of a habit conformable to nature was the proper 
formal cause of pleasure.ll The reason given was that these unim-
peded operations specify pleasures to be of one kind rather than 
lOIbid., 32, 1 c. 
lIla IV ~., 49, 3, 2 c. 
another. Similar doctrine is contained in the reply to the first 
objection in the article from the SU.rllIna now under discussion. This 
... .. 
~eply brings out more clearly than the body of the article that 
tpleasure does not mel"ely follow tho operation but is oaused by it. 
Ad prlmum ergo dicendum quod ipsa objeota operationum 
non sunt deloctabllia, nisi inquantum conjIDlguntur nobis: 
vel per cognitionom solam, sicut oum deleotwnur in oon-
sideratione vel inspectione aliquoruffij vel quocumque alio 
modo simul cum oognitione, siout cum aliquis dolectatur 
in hoc quod c08no8cit se habere quodcll.l11quo bonum, puta 
divitias vel honorem, vel aliquid hujusmodl; quae quidem 
non essent deloctabilia, nisi Inquantum approhenduntur 
ut habita. • •• Habere autem hujusmodi nihil est aliud 
quam uti €lis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per al iquam 
operationem. Unde manifestum est quod omnia delectatl0 
in operationom reducitur sicut in causam. 12 
IEvery pleasure, therefore, can be reduced to .ro me oper'ation as its 
cause, fOl'" suitable goods come to be possessed by a being only 
through the mediation of sorne operation. The operation itself is 
the proximate cause of pleasure; the good which is the object of 
the operation is the remote cause.13 
What kind of causal ity does the operation exercise, formal 
or e.fficient? It was recently notod that Thomas spoke of the ope-
ration as the formal cause of pleasu.re in tho Sentences, though he 
by no means excluded it from exercising efficient causality. Hera 
in the SUnl"JB. we read: tI[C]ontlnglt quod duo sibi inviceru aunt 
l2.§..!., I-II, 32, 1 ad 1. 
l30f course, the operation must be natural and in due propor-
tion. "Oparationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt proportiona-
tae at oonnaturalos oper~~ti.n l2!£., ad 3. For the parallel 
dootrine in the Sentences see In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2 C J which is 
disoussed on pp. 36-38 of thlsthesiS;-
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causa, ita quod unum sit oausa offioiens, et aliud oausa finalls 
alter:lus. Et pOl' huno modum, operatio oausat delootatlonem siout 
oausa offioions; deleotatio autem pertici t opol"ationem pOZ' modum 
finis. "ll~ Here is a olear statement that the operation is an effi-
ciont cause of ploasure. The reason is that a cognitive being can 
possess a suitable good only tl~ough some unimpeded operation con-
formable to its nature. When the good has been acquired, pleasure 
follows upon the operation as a natural effeot, oompletinG and per-
fectIng it. The operation is also a formal oause of pleasure, for 
it specifies the pleasure to be of one kind rather than another. 
The operation, of oourse, is speoified by its objeot, some suitable 
good. Thus it seems oorreot to say that the operation and its ob-
jeot are as one oomposite good whioh both oauses and specifies the 
resultant p10asure. 
It seems olear to the writer that St. Thomas has finally 
solved a major problem here in question 32 of the Prill!e: Secill1;daE!.. 
That problem is one ot: reoonoiling the traditional soholastic and 
~hristlan de1"inition of pleasure as "quietatio appetitus in bono" 
or "quies in bono adepto" and Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure as 
an operation or an after-effeot of an operation. 
More precisely, there are two perspeotives of pleasure whioh 
~homa8 has succeeded in fitting together. The first might be 
called the Christian-Platonio. An objective good, something ex-
14s•T., I-II, 3), 4 ad Z. FO~ almost identioal dootrine see 
1!: IV sent., 49, 3, 4, sol • .3 0, wr.doh ia quoted on p. 38. 
1 
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trinsic (specifically, God) is acquired, and this acquisition re-
sults in pleasure. The second is Aristotle's position, which says 
that natures are for operations. When a being of a certain nature 
erforms its proper operation easily and without hindrance, pleas-
ure follows. In this view the objective good practically becomes 
a matter of indifference. 
St. Thomas manages to link these two positions very nicely. 
The perspective he takes can be seen here in questions 32 and 33, 
here the operation is soen as linking the person .!!!S!. h!! good, 
and then the operation itself is seen as a good of the person. 
Aristotle would have said only the latter. By this priority St. 
Thomas keeps himself in the Christian context. It seems clear 
that the Aristotelian influence on St. Thomas is not as great here 
in the Sumraa as it was in the Sentences. 
As one observes the variations and chan[~es in St. Thomas t s 
discussion of pleasure, "hat seems to have happened is this: the 
Christian-Platonic inher! tance \vhich St. Thomas received was grad-
ually shifted to an Aristotelian theol'1Y, but in such a way that the 
old was preserved in the new. It would be necessary to know more 
about the theories current at the time st. Thomas bagan writing, 
and also to be able to deterrrlne more accurately whether in inter-
preting Aristotle as he did Thomas thoue.,ht he was being literally 
faithful to the Stagyrite. However, the end result is a theory 
which preserves the Christian-Platonic philosophy of pleasure as 
rest in the possession of a. good (God), and yet makes use of the 
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~ristotelian after-effeot or "overflow" of a good activity (know-
P.edge) • 
Brief consideration must now be given to the effects of pleas-
~e. Actually, only one effect of pleasure remains to be discusse~ 
~or two other effects were dealt with in treatinG the nature of 
~leasure. These two were dilatatio and pleasure's causing desire 
~or itself. In words very similar to those he used in the ~ommen­
rtary 2!! ~ ;;;;;;E . ..;;;,t;;.;;h.;;:;.i.;;;,c.;;;.s, Thomas says that pleasure perfects the opera-
tion which is its cause. 
[D]electatio duplicitor operationem parfioit. Uno modo, 
per modum finis; non quidem secundum quod finis dicltur 
id propter quod aliquod est; sed secundum quod Ollme bonum 
completive supervenlens potest dici finis. • • , inquantum 
scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit 
aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quieta-
tionem appetitus in bono praesupposito. ----Secundo modo, 
ex parte causae agentis. Non quidem dirocte. • •• In-
directe autem: inquantum scilicet a[:;ens, quia delectatur 
in sua actione, vehemeotius attondit ad ipsam, et dili-
gentius eam operatur. 15 
The doctrine here is so similar to the Ethics, that it requires no 
comraont. 
One final point will conclude the presentation of the doctrine 
on pleasure as found in the Summa. In the chapters on the .~ente~ ... 
~ and the De Veri tate mention was made of a kind of pre-deleota-
-
tion. This term was used to denote the first movemont of the ap-
lPotite by a suitable good before the good was actua.lly acquired. 
For this reason it was also called a "movement-toward-possession." 
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!Here in the StL.'lllna this notion of pre-deleotation is more fully de-
~eloped. In discussing whether motion can be the cause of pleas-
rura" Thomas remarks: "[I]d quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat por-
it'eote id ad quod movetul--, inoiplt taman jam aliquid habere ejus ad 
quod movetur: at secundum hoc, ipse notus habet aliquid deleota-
tionis. n16 By the expression "habet aliquid delectationis," Thomas 
soems to denote a sort of inoipient or pre-delectation. 
With this the salient points of the doctrine on pleasure in 
the ~umma Theologiae have b0en presented. The next and final 
ohapter will sUlnmal'>ize the work of the thosis. 
16Ibid., 32, 2, ad 1. 
-
CHAPTER V I I 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing St. Thomas's discussion and tl"eatrl0ut of pleas-
o in the four works under exal'11ina tion, it seems cloar that in 
the discussion focuses around the f'ollmvlng questions: 
1) Is pleasure a "z:eJ2ose in a good acquired" or is it a "natu-
unimpeded ac,tivitZ"? In other words, is pleasure a state or a 
If' pleasure partakes of' both, how does Thomas reconcile 
two? 
2) If pleasure is an activity or move.tlent, in what sense is 
true? Is pleasure identical with the operation which produces 
rather an oEigino}'l1onon, an after-effect, which is con-
sequent upon the operation? 
3) If pleasure is an af'ter-off'oct of' an operation, is this 
Iso a kind of activity or movement? 
4) Is pleasure a passion'? That is, is it a real movement or 
ot? (Obviously, this will dopend on the ansvver to the third ques-
ionl. 
5) If pleasure is a movelllent, what kind of movemont is it? 
6) Does pleasure belong to appetite or to cog,nltion? 
7) Vihat is the relation betweon appetite, cognition, and 
odily change in pleasure? 
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8) vYhat is the differenoe between pleasure and joy? Is there 
any relation between them? 
The preceding chapters have prepared the way for answering 
these questions. By recalling points made in these ohapters and 
synthesizing them, the answers to these eight questions should oome 
clear. 
The first question: Is pleasure a state or a movement? Right 
tl"om the first in the Sentenoes it was noted that Thomas was work-
ing with two views of pleasure: the Christian-Platonio "repose in 
a good acquired" and the Aristotelian lfnatural unimpeded aotivity.lf 
It 1s diffioult to say how consoious St. Thomas was that Aristotle 
was working without the oontext of the objeotive good, and almost 
exolusively 1n an operational oontext. However, the Al"istotellan 
influenoe is quite noticeable from the frequent quotations made 
from the IHcomachean Ethios. 
In the Sentence!, Thomas stresses that pleasure is the termi-
nation of appetitive movement, that is, it is the end of movement 
to acquire the desired good. This would seem to make pleasure 8. 
state. However, Thomas is quiok to add that lfin the termination of 
the appetitive movement, a oertain movement arises in which the 
psyohical paSSion oonsists." He elaborates very little on this 
"certain movement."l But further on he notes that there is a pleas 
ure whioh follows upon the posseSSion of a good, and that this 
1pp. 31-32 and footnote 8. 
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leasure is oaused by the operation which unites the being with its 
ood objeot. In brier, the Sentenoes does not settle the question, 
ut both the Christian and Aristotelian influences are pl"esent. 
In the !2! Ver'itate, pleasure, at least bodlly pleasure, is 
said to consist in apprehension, but there is very little discus-
about whether pleasure is a state or a movement. 
In the Commentapy .2!.! ~ Ethics the doctrine presentod is 
consi stont wi th that of the ~entence.~: knowledge or a Bood 
rise to appetitive movement toward that good; when the appe-
ite rinds rest in the possession of the good, pleasure results. 
here is this differenoe, however: in the E;thics, pleasure is 
learly in the ordor of rinality, being the crowing perfection of 
unimpeded operation. Still, the nature or this orowning perfec-
ion 1s vague. Is it a state of rest, a fUl"thel" movement of the 
ppetite, or something else? 
The Summa Theolohiae provides the definite answer. There it 
clear that pleasure is a movement or activity, not a state. 
homas distinguishes two movements of the appetite, one of desire 
or a good, the other of pleasure in this good onoe it has been ao-
The prior movement at: desire also oauses movement toward 
ossession in the order of exeoution. When the good object has 
een acquired desire ceases and the external opel"ation toward pos-
ession comes to an end, but the appetite still oontinues to be 
the good object still present and now in its possession. 
as suoh is the movement or a.ctivity of tho appetite caused 
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by the possession of a suitablo good. Thus it can be seen how 
Thomas reconciles the Christian and Aristotelian views: pleasure 
involves both the termination (9.uie"~) of desire and movement toward 
possession, and the activity (fyepytlCt) of the appetite in posses-
sion of a suitable good. 
The second question: If pleasure is an activity or movement, 
Is it identical with the operation which produces it, or is it 
rather an epiginoll!enon, an after-effect, whioh is consequent upon 
the opera.tion? 
The answor to this question is quite oonsistent in the four 
works under examination. Pleasure is ca.used by unhampered opera-
!tions. Unhampol""ed operations of habits cOnfOI'l'llable to nature are 
pel"rected or crowned by pleasure. Pleasure is the crowning per-
fection of an unhmnpered operation. 2 
The reason for this is not far to seek. Every suitable good 
whioh attracts oan be acquired and satisfy the appetite only 
tl1rough the mediation of some operation. If this operation is 
natural and unhampered, pleasure results, crowning or perfecting 
the operation. 
The third question: If pleasure is an after-effect of an oper-
ation, is this also a kind of activity or movement? The answer is 
in the affirmative. The operation puts the being in possession of 
a suitable good, which satisfies one or more of its appetites. The 
2pp • 38 and 75-76. 
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presence of this good causes a continued movement of the appetite. 
This m.ovement is what is meant by an episinomenon or after-effect. 3 
The fourth question: Is pleasure a passion? That is, is it a 
real movement of the appetite or not? The anSWOl" to the question 
is in the affirmative, but certainly it is given with more emphasis 
and assurance in the later works. 
In the Sentenoes Thomas hesitates to call pleasure a paSSion 
because of h1s emphasis on the termination of appetitive movement 
in speaking of pleasure. It thus seems to lack the essential note 
of motion. But because pleasure always seems to involve some 
bodily change or movement, Tho1:nas says "est in quadam passiono con-
sistens." 
In the Q! Veri tate Thomas deals mainly with joy, giving little 
notice to pleasure. However, he says in effect that pleasure is 
pot a passion beoause it belongs to the apprehensive part of the 
soul, not to the appetitive. 
In the ~thios Thomas olearly nmnbers pleasure among the pas-
sions of the appetitive part of the soul. But again there is the 
reservation that pleasure involves the termination of appetitive 
movement and is something consequent upon this termination. 
In the Summa there is no doubt about Thomas's position. 
. . 
Pleasure is a passion in the strict sense, for it is a real move-
mont of the sense appetite oaused by tho possession of a suitable 
3pp• 38, 86-87. 
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good.4 This final position that pleasure is always a movement 
sives Q basis for explaining the fluctuating intensity of pleasure. 
This basis was hardly present in the earlier position, if present 
at all. 
An interesting sidelip;ht on the development of this doctrIne 
is provided by Jean Langlois, S.J. He says that the speoifio dif-
ference between pleasure and the othor paSSions is the notion of 
Iqulos, repose, satisfaction of" the appeti to in the possession or 
r..' 
real presence of a suitable good.;> Thom.as had to reoonci1e this 
~ith the notion of movement, Which 1s an essential note of passion 
in the striot sense. 
The fifth question: If pleasure is a movement, what leind of 
movement is it? As has been stated, pleasure is a movement of the 
sense appetite in possession of a suitable good. But this is 
Thomas's mature doctrine in the Summa. In the Sentenoes Thomas 
seems to place a good deal of stress on the bodily chanGes that 
usually aooompany pleasure. In fact, 't;hese acoom.panying ohane;es 
are the reason why he oal1s pleasure a paSSion, since ~leasure is 
said to oonsist in the termination of movement of the appetite 
toward a suitable cood. 
In the !2! Veri tate Thomas says tha.t pleasure be1onp;s to the 
apprehensive powers, not to the appetItive. "Pleasure of either 
4p'. ~79. S.T., I-II, 31, 1 ad 2. 
- -
5Jean Langlois, S.J., "La definition de 113. d61ectation," Lava+. 
Theo1og1que !E. Philosophlque, V (1949), p. 177. 
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kind begins with a real union and ends in ita apprehension. Joy, 
~owever, bef,ins wi th apprehension and ends in the affections. tt6 
trherefore it seems that plea.sure involves a change only in the 
fapprehensive powers a.nd is not strictly 8. passion. 
In the Ethics Thomas says that pleasure follows upon all movo-
~ents of the appetitive part of the soul. 7 The reason is that all 
ithese passions involve movement of the appetites in regard to good 
~nd evil, and the attainment of the good desired or the incurring 
pf the evil is the cause of pleasure or sadness. But just what the 
!exact nature of pleasure is, what kind of movement it is, Thomas 
does not clearly state. 
In the Summa, however, it is perfectly clear that pleasure is 
a movement of the sense appetites caused by the actual possession 
pr real presence of some suitable good. Desire and movement in the 
prder of exeoution have been terminated, but tile continued presence 
pf the object causes continued movement or the appetite. 
The sixth question: Doea pleasure lie in the appetite or in 
pognltion? Of' the four works studied in this thesis, only the .!2! 
~eritate states that pleasure lies in oognition, being terminated 
~n the act of' apprehension. But even in this \vorl< Thomas sta.tes 
~hat sense apprehensIon always involves some oorrespondin.g movement 
~n the sonse appetite. Two different reoonciliations of the doo-
6~ruth, 26, 4 ad 5. 
7pp• 70-71. 
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trine of De Verltate with the other three mrks were presented in 
- . 
:Jhapter IV. Certainly the author does not agree with Langlois that 
~here is no possible reoonciliation between the doctrine of the 
~hird book of the Sent~~ces and the Q! ~V~e_r_i_t_a_t_e.8 
The other three W) rks uniformly state that cognition is most 
pften the Q~ampered operation which is the formal cause of pleas-
ure, but the pleasure itself is in the appetitive part of the soul. 
All .four \\t) rits clearly state that without cognition there oan be no 
pleasure, but both tho ~thics and the Summa ole£u"ly distinguish 
between the cognitive operation whioh causes pleasure and the per-
feotion of pleasure whiol1 orowns that cognitive op~ration "sicut 
quaedam superveniens finis."9 
The seventh question: ~Vhat is the relation between appetite, 
cognition, 81d bodily change in pleasure? From what has been said, 
ithe answer to this question must be evident. To put it in techni-
cal language, appetite is the subject of pleasure, cognition is the 
~ormal cause and bodily change is the material cause. Cognition 
is the formal cauae, for in addition to making a beine a~are of a 
good suitable for itself, it specifies the resultant pleasure to 
be of one kind rather than another. 
The e1~lth question: \Vhat is the dIfference between pleasure 
and joy? Is there any relation between them? There is a notable 
182. 
8Jean Langlois, S.J., "La definition de la delectation," p. 
See also pp. LtC> and 40 of this thesis. 
9pp. 75-76 and 51+-85. 
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growth and development of the Thomistic doctrine on this point. 
In the Sentences, Thomas distinGuishes between pleasure and 
joy on the basis of real contact and presence. For example, if a 
an actually eats a good meal, he experienoes pleasure. If he only 
anticipates this good meal or J'emernbers it, or pOSSibly, also re-
flects on it while eating it, he experiences joy. In other words, 
the distinction is between real or physical possession and inten-
tional possession. This is not the srune as the distinction between 
sensible and rational. 
In the ~ verita~e, the distinction between pleasure and joy 
seems based on the order of reciprocity. That is, if the pleasant 
experienoe begins in the oorporeal or appetitive order and ends in 
the apprehensive, pleasure results. For example, a oooling breeze 
lays over my perspiring body. When I beoome aware of this in my 
mind, I experienoe pleasure. 
However, joy is front the reflexive knowledge of the possession 
of a pleasurable good. If one reflects on the goodness of e>"1'eri-
onoing a oooling breeze, this kn,owlodt::e eives joy. 
In both the N~c.omachean Ethics and the Surnl11a Theologi!.! the 
doctrine on this point is uniform. Suitable tUlilnpedod activity on 
the sense or physical level gives rise to pleasure; on the rational 
level it oauses joy_ In tlH3se two wor'ks the basis of the distinc-
tions is the kind of oognitive and appetitive activity involved in 
the pleasant experienoe. In brief, pleasure belongs to the sense 





The four pl'>imary so;}rces of this study span approximately 
Ififteen years in the life of St. Thomas. Between the first and 
last of them especially thel~e is noticeable a growth in olal"'ity, 
IPrecision, and firr.moss of doctrine. Although Thomas certainly 
knew of the !!!.comachaan Ethios when he wrote his Com::nentarx .£!! the 
Sentences, the use he thero makes of the Aristotelian doctrine does 
not compare with the way he incorporates it into his own in the 
Summa. In the Sentences he uses many more words, but the doctrine 
lacks the clarity and force it has in the St.Uru:la. An example is the 
distinction between pleasure and joy that has just been considered. 
r.rhomas dwells on this point at some length in three diffcu'Emt 
places in the Sent~nces, but tails to present a clear-cut distinc-
tion. Yet in the Summa that result is achieved in the space of two 
. 
short articles .. lO This study has witnessed not only the growth of 
doctrine but also the growth of the philosopher. 
10.2,.1_, I-II, 31, 1 and 2. 
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